Research On The Relationship Between The Autonomy And Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies

With the continuous development of China's securities market and the deepening of mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs),listed companies have gradually established a standardized governance system and formed a matching shareholding structure.In this context,the issue of corporate governance of listed companies has received extensive attention from both the practical and academic circles.However,there are still unique practical problems in the Chinese capital market development at the present stage.Because of the difference of historical evolution and diversity of property right nature,and difference from the overall asset listing of foreign group companies,most domestic listed companies in China are listed by group companies splitting some high-quality assets,thus forming two different legal subjects for group company and listed company.The ubiquity of this "two-tier and three-tier" or more complex equity structure increases the length of the original agency chain,and at the same time causes the agency problem of Chinese listed companies that is different from those in the United States,Britain and other countries.The issues of first and second type of agency coexist,and the parties with conflicts of interest include actual controllers,major shareholders,minority shareholders,and listed companies.Most of the existing studies on corporate governance are based on the "top-down" one-way governance dimension of the pyramid ownership structure to explore the role of actual controllers,major shareholders,or parent companies in the governance of listed companies.However,this research approach has certain limitations.It neither systematically considers practical problems,nor does it simultaneously bring the independent governance and checks and balances capabilities of listed companies as independent legal entities into the research field of vision.The current literature on autonomy research is mostly based on the background of multinational corporations and enterprise groups,expounding the autonomy of subsidiaries based on the relationship between parent-subsidiary corporations.This often overlooks the "hidden" influence of the traceable actual controller in corporate governance under the pyramid ownership structure,and it is difficult to fully reflect the root cause of frequent occurrence of capital market problems at this stage.As an independent legal entity,a listed company should not only be limited to obeying the arrangements of actual controllers or major shareholders.It should also protect the righte and interests of stakeholders represented by minority shareholders.However,the current governance system of listed companies is difficult to restrain the opportunistic behavior of actual controllers or major shareholders.Specifically,on the one hand,if the actual controller or the parent company controls the actual power of the listed company through equity setting and voting rights arrangements,the actual controller or the parent company has the incentive to directly influence the internal power allocation within the listed company(control a majority of board seats and directly appoint the senior management team),and then use the advantages of information asymmetry to achieve collusion with listed companies,infringe on the interests of minority shareholders through the "tunneling effect" and "entrenchment effect" and other ways to capture the benefits of excess control rights.On the other hand,when the actual controller or the parent company cannot agree with the listed company on the short-term and the long-term interests of the company's operations,the listed company cannot only enhance its endogenous ability of equity checks and balances through a sound corporate governance mechanism,but also can improve corporate transparency,strengthen internal control elements,introduce strategic investors and employ four international accounting firms and other exogenous variables to restrain the actual controller or the parent company's opportunistic behavior from the dimension of power balance in order to guarantee the operation and strategic autonomy of listed company.Considering the capital market environment under the background of China 's unique property rights relationship,the shareholding structure relationships,social attributes,and interest driving factors exhibited by state-controlled,listed companies with equity participation and private listed companies are also quite different,which is a great challenge to accurately grasp the causes of the governance problems of listed companies and to design targeted governance mechanisms.At present,listed companies in China are increasingly emphasizing their independent legal personality and their positive interactions with actual controllers,major shareholders or parent companies,and build their independent governance system through the process of game with various stakeholders,and take this as the main path of corporate governance innovation.Compared with the traditional "top-down" one-way governance research paradigm,this study offers an in-depth analysis on the theoretical mechanism of the formation of the autonomy of listed companies based on the research context of "two-way governance",which greatly expands the research framework of group companies and parent and subsidiary companies.Through the introduction of economic cooperative game—non-cooperative game theory,the autonomy analysis matrix and mathematical model of listed companies are constructed,which reveal the bargaining process and game result between actual controllers,major shareholders or parent companies and listed companies around the company's residual control rights.Furthermore,this study combines the governance practices of listed companies in China and proposes that the study on the autonomy of listed companies from the perspective of "two-way governance" should integrate the "implicit control" view of actual controller,the "explicit control" view of controlling shareholder or parent company and the concept of checks and balances of listed companies.Based on the concept of checks and balances,the autonomy index system of listed companies is constructed,which is-aggregated through the principal component analysis method,aiming to solve the problem of the unity and weakness of the current "independence" research index.At this stage,maximizing shareholder equity is still the main goal for corporate governance,and the equity of various stakeholders is closely related to the performance of listed companies.Therefore,this research study endeavors to answer on how to evaluate the role of the autonomy of listed companies in the process of corporate management and governance.The current study proposes a result-oriented and process-oriented corporate performance classification standard,which aims to clarify the confusion and ambiguity in the use of corporate performance in current theoretical research,so as to guide investors to establish a comprehensive and systematic evaluation system for the management and governance effects of listed companies.Furthermore,through in-depth analysis of the operation and governance links,theoretical analysis and empirical testing are used to demonstrate the result-oriented relationship between the autonomy of listed companies and financial performance,and the association between the autonomy of listed companies and the quality of information disclosure based on governance norms.These relationships reveal the path and specific contextual factors of the autonomy of listed companies influencing corporate performance.This study uses the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2018 to conduct empirical tests on the above issues.The test results support the hypothesis that the autonomy of listed companies has a positive governance effect.Specifically,firstly,this study explores the association between the autonomy of listed companies and corporate financial performance based on result orientation.The research findings suggest that(1)the autonomy of listed companies and the financial performance of companies show a significant positive correlation that is the higher the autonomy of listed companies,the better the corporate financial performance;(2)the nature of property rights,the degree of marketization,and the degree of product market competition play a moderating role in the relationship between the autonomy of listed companies and financial performance;(3)the embezzlement of major shareholders,the level of internal control and the level of innovation capabilities play a part of the intermediary role in the relationship between the autonomy and financial performance of listed companies.In addition,this study further investigates the process mechanism of the influence of the autonomy of listed companies on the quality of information disclosure based on the normative governance orientation.The research finds that(1)the autonomy of listed companies and the quality of information disclosure reveal a significant positive correlation,that is the greater the autonomy of listed companies,the better the quality of information disclosure;(2)the nature of property rights,high-quality audits,company transparency,and product market competition play a moderating role in the relationship between the autonomy of listed companies and the quality of information disclosure;(3)the second type of agency cost plays a partial intermediary role between the autonomy of listed companies and the quality of information disclosure.The autonomy of listed companies can improve the level of information disclosure by restraining the behavior of major shareholders.Based on this,this study uses a large sample to prove that the autonomy of listed companies exerts a positive governance effect on the result-based corporate financial performance and the quality of information disclosure based on the normative guidance of process governance,differences in the impact of actual controllers under different ownership structure designs on corporate value and growth.On the whole,breaking through the traditional research boundary of "one-way governance",and starting from the interactive relationship between the actual controller,the controlling shareholder or the parent company and the listed company,this research enriches and develops the theoretical basis for the autonomy of listed companies,clarifies the positive governance effect of autonomy on the sustainable development of the company,reveals the path and contextual factors of the impact of listed companies on corporate performance,which can contribute to a deeper understanding of the positive direction of the independent governance of listed companies on the sustainable development of the company enhancement.It provides enlightenment and reference for giving full play to the autonomy of listed companies,improving the performance of listed companies and protecting the rights and interests of stakeholders.