Research On The Control Structure And Corporation's Quality Of Information Disclosure

At present, China's securities business has made great progress, and the degree of market regulation is also rising. However, currently there are still quality problems of China's accounting information disclosure. Meanwhile, as the economic globalization leads to the global expansion of capital markets, companies are faced with more intense competition and more harsh disclosure requirements despite of the broader capital markets. Therefore, the quality problem of the information disclosure for the listed company remains a concern.With the deeper and broader research on information disclosure, the academic circle has begun to pay more attention to the affecting factors of the information disclosure for the listed company. At present, many achievements on this aspect have been made by both domestic and foreign scholars. However, the current analysis framework of most scholars remains in the effect of directly controlling shareholder while it is seldom made from the perspective of the actual controller's interest's tendency and behavior to research the quality of information disclosure. Even fewer studies have been made from the perspective of the effect of the properties of the listed company in our country on the quality of the information disclosure for the listed company by constructing a specialized control structure. Therefore, demonstration research on the relationship between control structure of listed companies in China and the quality of information disclosure has been made by using the annual report data in this thesis.In this thesis, the panel data of Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed company from the year 2004 to 2007 is cited to make a multiple linear regression analysis. In the control structure of the company, it sets a total of four explanatory variables, that is, respectively, the actual controller's nature, listed company's ownership percentage that the actual controller owns, ownership concentration and control levels. Meanwhile, whether chairman and managing director held by a pluralist or not, the rate of independent director, the total size of auditing, assets logarithmic scale and return on equity are considered to be controlled variables of this thesis.The analyzed results show that different actual controllers of listed companies show apparent different quality of information disclosure. Central control of state-owned enterprises are listed on the top; local state-owned enterprises and state-owned asset management controlled companies the second; natural control the third. There exists significant positive correlation between ownership concentration and quality of information disclosure of listed companies. Besides, quality of information disclosure has a positive correlation with the listed company's ownership percentage that the actual controller owns and a negative correlation with control hierarchy. Finally, this thesis tries to promote some suggestions on the improvement of quality of information disclosure, based on the empirical analysis and the point of view of the control structure.