| The turnover of top managers has two basic characteristics:the inevitability of turnover and the instability caused by turnover.No matter what form of turnover of the top managers,all means that the highest the handover of power.It involves the reconfiguration of corporate control,the integration of senior management team and the change of business strategy.The improper handling of the enterprise may become the watershed from prosperity to decline because of the strong complexity and difficulty.With the increasing number of executive change events in enterprises,how to ensure the stable operation of enterprises during the executive change and the sustainable and stable development after the change has become an important topic of common concern in academic and practical circles.For the enterprises,one of the key factors affecting the stable operation and sustainable development of enterprises is the stability of credit funds and credit costs for the,especially at the critical node of the change of senior executives.On the one hand,bank credit is an important source for enterprises to obtain stable and sustainable external funds in China.According to the special statistics of the regional financial operation report of the People's Bank of China,the balance of bank loans accounted for 87%of the total financing balance on average in 2019.On the other hand,during the change of senior management,the strategic adjustment or reorganization of enterprises and the reconstruction of external social network need the support of external credit funds.Therefore,it is of great significance to explore whether the change of senior executives will lead to the adjustment of bank-enterprise credit contracts and the reasons for the adjustment for the stable operation and smooth transition during the change of senior executives.However,there are few researches on the turnover of top managers and credit contract adjustment,and there are some deficiencies.Based on this,this paper attempts to conduct a comprehensive theoretical discussion and empirical test on the turnover of corporate executives and the adjustment of bank-enterprise credit contracts based on the institutional background of China and the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2018.Considering that there is a certain degree of financial repression in China,there are not only explicit credit contracts with legal effect,such as nominal loan amount,nominal interest rate and term,but also implicit contracts to some extent between banks and enterprises.In order to make the research more complete,this paper brings the possible implicit contracts between banks and enterprises into the research framework at the same time.Specifically,this paper mainly answers the following three questions:First,will the turnover of senior executives cause the adjustment of explicit and implicit credit contracts between Banks and enterprises?Is there any difference in the adjustment of credit contracts between Banks and enterprises due to different types of executive change and different nature of enterprises?Second,what are the reasons for the adjustment of explicit and implicit credit contracts caused by the change of corporate executives?Third,in the face of the adjustment of credit contracts between Banks and enterprises,how do enterprises cope with the change of senior executives and the response effect?Through the study of the above problems,this paper is expected to reveal the adjustment of credit contracts between banks and enterprises,the reasons for the adjustment,as well as the enterprises' response methods and response effects after the turnover of senior executives.From the perspective of corporate creditors,it further clarifies the economic consequences that the change of corporate executives may bring to enterprises,and provides theoretical basis and empirical evidence for how to guarantee the stability of credit contracts between banks and enterprises during the turnover of corporate executives.To answer the above questions,this paper is divided into seven parts for discussion:The first part is introduction.This part mainly introduces the background of topic selection,theoretical significance and practical value,research content,research method and innovation.The second part is literature review.This part will comprehensively review the determinants of bank-enterprise credit contracts and the relevant literature on the economic consequences of executive change in enterprises,and comb the relevant studies on executive change and credit contract adjustment in enterprises.On the basis of the overall review of all literatures,the inheritance and breakthrough of this paper are highlighted.The third part is theoretical basis and analysis.This part mainly introduces the theoretical basis including:the information asymmetry theory related to the bank-enterprise credit contract,the agency cost theory of creditor's rights,the manager's defense theory and the asset specificity theory are related to the reason of the adjustment of bank and enterprise credit contract caused by the change of senior management,the bank correlation theory and rent-seeking theory which are related to the adjustment mode of credit contract between Banks and enterprises,and the supporting role of the above theory in this paper are analyzed.The fourth part is the empirical test of whether the change of senior management leads to the adjustment of bank and enterprise credit contract.It mainly includes the empirical test of the change of corporate executives and the adjustment of explicit credit contract between Banks and enterprises,the empirical test of the change of senior executives and the adjustment of implicit credit contracts between Banks and enterprises,and the further study of the differences of the adjustment of credit contracts between Banks and enterprises caused by the change of senior executives in different types of enterprises and different nature of enterprises.The fifth part is the empirical test of the reasons for the adjustment of bank and enterprise credit contracts caused by the change of enterprise executives.This part puts forward four hypotheses of reasons for the adjustment of bank and enterprise credit contracts caused by the change of corporate executives through theoretical analysis,including the hypothesis of increased information uncertainty,the hypothesis of asset substitution effect,the hypothesis of resource rupture of executive relations and the hypothesis of financing constraint.The sixth part is the empirical test of the way and effect of the adjustment of credit contract after the turnover of senior management.On the basis of the fifth part,this part examines the ways that enterprises choose to ease the adjustment of credit contracts.First of all,this part puts forward the hypothesis that the adjustment of credit contract will be alleviated through the construction of bank association and credit rent-seeking after the turnover of enterprise senior executives.Then,this part constructs a model to empirically test the hypothesis,and further examines the differences of enterprises' response to credit contract adjustment under different types of executive change and different sources of executive succession.The seventh part is conclusions,policy recommendations and limitations.This part will summarize the research conclusions of each chapter of this paper,and based on the research conclusions,it will put forward targeted policy suggestions for listed companies,banks and relevant regulatory authorities.At the same time,it will point out the shortcomings of this paper in the research process,and look forward to the future improvements and improvements.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:Conclusion one:The turnover of corporate executives will lead to the adjustment of bank-enterprise credit contracts,including the adjustment of explicit credit contracts and implicit credit contracts.The adjustment of explicit credit contract is mainly reflected in the reduction of credit scale,the increase of credit interest rate and the requirement of more credit guarantee after the turnover of corporate executives.The adjustment of implicit credit contract is mainly reflected in the increased probability of the retention of corporate credit funds by banks after the turnover of corporate executives,which in a disguised way causes the increase of credit costs.Further research shows that the content and degree of credit contract adjustment are different with different types of executive change and different sources of the succeeding executive after the change.Banks have different reactions to the turnover of senior executives in state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.Only the turnover of senior executives in private enterprises will lead to the adjustment of the bank-enterprise credit contract,while for the change of senior executives in state-owned enterprises,the bank-enterprise credit contract does not change.Conclusion two:The increase of enterprise information uncertainty is the main reason for the adjustment of bank-enterprise credit contracts,which will lead to the all-round adjustment of bank-enterprise credit contracts,which is specifically reflected in the decrease of credit scale,the increase of credit interest rate,the decrease of the proportion of credit loans and the increase of the retention probability of bank loans after the turnover of senior executives.The problem of asset substitution in the agency cost of creditor's rights,the rupture of relationship resources of outgoing executives and the bank rip-off behavior caused by the increase of financing constraints after the change of senior executives are also the reasons for the adjustment of bank-enterprise credit contracts caused by the turnover of senior executives,but it will only lead to partial adjustment of credit contracts.Among them,the increase of asset substitution only leads to the increase of credit interest rate and the decrease of the proportion of credit loans in the credit amount;the rupture of senior management relationship resources only leads to the reduction of bank and enterprise credit scale after the change of senior management;the increase in the degree of financing constraints caused by the bank rip-off behavior only leads to the increase in the bank and enterprise credit rates.Conclusion three:after the turnover of senior executive,enterprises will ease the adjustment of credit contract in two ways:first,establishing a bank association,which is specifically reflected in the increase in the probability of hiring directors or executives with banking background and the increase in the number of directors or team members with banking background after the turnover of senior executives;The second is credit rent-seeking,which is embodied in the strengthening of the positive correlation between the increase of business entertainment expenses and the amount of short-term loans after the change of senior executives.Further research found there was no significant difference in the degree of probability increase of establishing the bank association among the different executive change samples.However,there are differences in the degree of credit rent-seeking,and credit rent-seeking is greater after the forced turnover of senior executives.There are significant differences in the degree of increase of bank association probability in the sample of different succession sources of senior executives.But there is no significant difference in the degree of credit rent-seeking. |
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