| The 1994 tax-sharing system reform played an important role in solving the problem of fiscal revenue distribution between the central and local governments.It effectively solved the problem of the low proportion of central fiscal revenue,but the division of fiscal expenditure responsibilities was very vague.Therefore,the reform of the tax-sharing system has led to the centralization of fiscal power while the expenditure responsibility has been continuously shifted down.Local governments have undertaken excessive expenditure responsibilities under limited financial resources,resulting in huge financial expenditure pressure.In addition,the promotion motivation of local officials has greatly stimulated the enthusiasm of local government officials to develop the local economy,resulting in a strong economic development motivation.In order to attract economic resources and drive economic growth in the jurisdiction,local governments began to attract economic resources through the implementation of disguised tax incentives and financial subsidies,thereby creating a phenomenon of "competition for growth" among local governments.In the context of extensive competition among local governments,because different types of fiscal expenditures have different effects in stimulating economic growth,such as education,medical and health,and social security and employment expenditures,the stimulating effect of economic growth in the short-term is not obviously,productive expenditures such as infrastructure construction can quickly stimulate economic growth in the short term,causing local governments to begin to lean toward infrastructure construction expenditures in fiscal expenditures,and the fiscal expenditure structure is seriously unbalanced.In the case of local government budget revenue constraints,the investment impulse caused by the fiscal expenditure bias has caused a strong financing demand.Before the implementation of the New Budget Law in 2015,local governments were not allowed to issue local debt on their own.Such hard rules forced local governments to seek other financing tools to ease financing needs.As land transfer fees and urban investment bond income are non-general public budget revenue,they are freely controlled by local governments.Therefore,local governments began to issue urban investment bonds through the establishment of financing platform companies,and at the same time obtain land transfer fees through land transfers.Urban investment bonds and land transfers have greatly eased local financing needs in a short period of time,and have become two commonly used financing tools for local governments.Under this background,the scale of urban investment bonds and land transfers has begun to expand rapidly.Based on the above logic,this paper selects urban investment bonds and land transfers in non-general public budget revenue as the analysis objects,and discusses the impact of local government fiscal expenditure bias on urban investment bond issuance and land transfers,in order to provide a useful reference for preventing and solving major economic risks.Based on the existing research results,this paper systematically analyzes the current situation of local government's fiscal expenditures,urban investment bond issuance,and land transfers,and develops theoretical and empirical analysis on the following three issues by constructing reasonable measurement indicators.First,it examines the impact of local government fiscal expenditure bias on the issuance of urban investment bonds;Second,it explores the impact of local government fiscal expenditure bias on land transfers;Finally,considering that local governments may have strategic interaction and competition in fiscal expenditure bias,we further build a spatial measurement model to examine the impact of fiscal expenditure bias on the issuance of urban investment bonds and land transfer.From the specific content point of view,this article mainly includes the following aspects:Chapter 1 is an introduction.First of all,it explains the background and research significance of this article.Secondly,it defines in detail the more important concepts in this article.Finally,it briefly expounds the research problems and structural arrangements,introduces the possible research methods used in this article,and the innovations and deficiencies of this article.Chapter 2 is a review of literature at home and abroad.First,the existing literature is sorted out from three aspects: fiscal expenditure bias,urban investment bond issuance,and land transfer.Secondly,on the basis of combing the literature,the existing research literature is further summarized,and the main contributions and deficiencies of the existing literature are evaluated.Chapter 3 is the institutional background and theoretical basis.First,we introduced the background of the fiscal system,urban investment bond and land system.Secondly,it further introduces the mainstream fiscal decentralization theory,including the main content and basic viewpoints of the first and second generation fiscal decentralization theories and the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization theory.Finally,we summarize the shortcomings of the existing fiscal decentralization theory.Chapter 4 is typical fact analysis.First of all,this chapter is mainly divided into three parts: the first part is the analysis of the status quo of fiscal expenditure bias;the second part is the analysis of the current situation of urban investment bond issuance;Secondly,each part mainly analyzes from the following three aspects: the first aspect is an introduction to the overall situation;the second aspect is an analysis of regional differences;and the third aspect is a summary of typical characteristics.The fifth,sixth and seventh chapters are the empirical analysis part of this paper and also the core part of this paper.Chapter 5 is the analysis of the effect of fiscal expenditure bias on the issuance of urban investment bonds.The research is mainly carried out from the following aspects:Firstly,the research hypothesis is proposed;Second,the research design.Mainly include model setting,variable selection,data description and correlation analysis;Third,research results and analysis.Including benchmark research results and heterogeneity analysis,in which heterogeneity analysis is carried out from four aspects:regional heterogeneity analysis,local financial heterogeneity analysis,official age heterogeneity analysis and development zone construction intensity heterogeneity analysis;Fourth,the substitution effect.Considering that both land transfer income and urban investment bonds are important sources of local fiscal revenue,there may be substitution effects between the two,that is,land transfer income may weaken the influence of fiscal expenditure bias on urban investment bonds.This article further builds on the benchmark regression model in order to consider the regulatory effect of land transfer.In addition,if there is a substitution relationship between land transfer income and urban investment bonds,then fiscal expenditures tend to have a smaller role in promoting urban investment bond issuance in regions with larger land transfers.In order to verify the above logic,we further divide the sample into two sub-samples of larger and smaller land transfer scale for estimation according to the scale of land transfer;Fifth,the endogenous problem.Considering that there may be endogeneity between fiscal expenditure bias and urban investment debt due to missing variables and two-way causality,on the one hand,this paper further estimates by constructing provincial-level fiscal expenditure bias indicators;on the other hand,this paper further selects the city's location.The annual average of the fiscal expenditure bias of other prefecture-level cities in the province is used as an instrument variable,and it is estimated using two-stage least squares(2SLS);sixth,the robustness analysis.The robustness test is mainly carried out from three aspects: variable substitution,elimination of abnormal samples,and relaxation of control of official characteristics;finally,the research conclusion of this chapter.Chapter 6 analyzes the effect of fiscal expenditure bias on land transfer.The research framework is similar to Chapter 5,mainly from the six aspects of the research hypothesis,research design,research results and analysis,substitution effects,endogenous issues,and robustness testing.First,put forward research hypothesis;second,research design.Mainly include model setting,variable selection,data description and correlation analysis;again,research results and analysis.Including benchmark research results and heterogeneity analysis,including heterogeneity analysis from the land transfer method heterogeneity analysis,local financial resources heterogeneity analysis,official age heterogeneity analysis and development zone construction intensity heterogeneity analysis Expand;fourth,substitution effect.Considering that there may be a substitution effect between urban investment bonds and land transfers,that is,urban investment bonds may weaken the influence of fiscal expenditure bias on land transfers,this article further considers the moderating effect of urban investment bonds.In addition,if there is a substitution relationship between land transfer income and urban investment bonds,then fiscal expenditures tend to have a smaller role in promoting land transfers in areas where urban investment bonds are issued on a larger scale.Based on this,we further divide the sample into two subsamples of urban investment bond issuance scale according to the scale of urban investment bond issuance;fifth,endogenous issues.Considering that there may be endogeneity between fiscal expenditure bias and land transfer due to missing variables and two-way causality,on the one hand,this paper further estimates by constructing provincial-level fiscal expenditure bias indicators;on the other hand,this paper further selects the provinces where the city is located.The annual average of the fiscal expenditure bias of other prefecture-level cities is used as an instrumental variable,and it is estimated using two-stage least squares(2SLS);sixth,robustness analysis.The robustness test is mainly carried out from three aspects: removing abnormal samples,replacing core explanatory variables,and adding province-time joint fixed effects.Finally,this chapter concludes the research.Chapter 7 is an expansive analysis: considering the influence of spatial strategy interactive behavior.The research is mainly carried out from the following aspects:First,the spatial correlation test.It is mainly divided into two parts: global spatial correlation test and local spatial correlation test;secondly,the establishment of spatial measurement model.It mainly starts from three aspects: introduction of spatial measurement model,selection of spatial weight matrix and construction of spatial measurement model;again,analysis of estimation results.The research mainly focuses on the impact of fiscal expenditure on the issuance of urban investment bonds and land transfers.Finally,this chapter concludes the research.Chapter 8 is the research conclusions and policy recommendations of this paper.First,make a comprehensive summary of relevant research conclusions based on the previous research.Second,related policy recommendations based on the research conclusions of this article.Based on the research in this paper,the following research conclusions are drawn:1.The degree of fiscal expenditure bias.First,through the calculation of the degree of local government fiscal expenditure bias in 2008-2016,we found that the local government fiscal expenditure bias showed a downward trend as a whole during 2008-2016,but the decline was not large,and the year with the lowest degree of fiscal expenditure bias still exceeded 0.60.Secondly,the statistical analysis results of regional differences show that there are obvious fiscal expenditure biases in eastern,central,and western regions and cities of different urban sizes.The eastern region has the highest fiscal expenditure bias,but the gap between the three is small.Finally,the results of regional heterogeneity statistical analysis also show that the degree of fiscal expenditure bias presents a typical "M-type" fluctuation characteristic,that is,the degree of fiscal expenditure bias began to rise in 2008,showed a downward trend in2010,and began to rise again in 2012.In 2014,it showed a downward trend again.2.Urban investment bond issuance.First,it mainly analyzes the issuance of urban investment bonds from the following four aspects.First,the overall situation of the city investment bond issuance.Except for 2015,both the amount of urban investment bonds issued and the number of issuances showed a clear upward trend,and the increase was very obvious.This shows that since 2008,the scale of my country's urban investment bond issuance has shown a rapid growth.The second is the structure of urban investment bonds.The analysis results show that the current urban investment bonds are mainly medium-term notes,corporate bonds,corporate bonds,directional instruments and short-term financing bonds,and the scale of the remaining varieties is very small.The third is the term structure of urban investment bonds.The analysis results show that the current urban investment bonds are mainly in the medium and long term(3-5 years,5-7 years,7-10 years),and the remaining urban investment bonds(within 1 year,1-3 years,more than 10 years)Smaller scale.Fourth,the rating structure of urban investment bonds.The analysis results show that the current overall situation of urban investment bond credit is good.Urban investment bond ratings are mainly AAA,AA+ and AA,and the balance of urban investment bonds of AA-and A-1 is relatively small.Second,there are significant regional differences in the issuance of urban investment bonds.The statistical analysis of regional heterogeneity shows that the issuance of urban investment bonds is mainly concentrated in economically developed regions(eastern regions and mega-megacities).Finally,there is no regional difference in the change trend of the issuance scale of urban investment bonds,and the change trend in different regions is basically the same.Specifically,since 2008,the issuance of urban investment bonds has grown slowly,and then it has shown a rapid growth trend.It was not until the "New Budget Law" implemented in 2015 that local governments can issue bonds on their own.A slight decline,but in 2016 there was a significant growth.3.Land transfer.First,the land transfer situation across the country.Through analysis,it is found that regardless of the amount,area,and number of land transfers,there is an "inverted U-shaped" change trend.Among them,the scale of land transfers increased rapidly from 2008 to 2013,and the scale of land transfers began to decline from 2013 to 2016.Secondly,the way of land transfer.At present,the land transfer is mainly based on the "bidding,auction and listing" transfer.Regardless of whether the land transfer is in the eastern,central or western regions,the “sales,auctions,and listings” of land transfer are the main ones,and the agreement transfers are the supplement.Again,the price of land transfers.Through the analysis,it is found that the price of the land transfer of "bidding,auction,auction" is much higher than that of the agreed land transfer.Finally,the regional heterogeneity of land transfer.The analysis results show that the current land transfer is mainly concentrated in the eastern region,while the scale of land transfer in the western region is relatively small.4.The influence of fiscal expenditure bias on the issuance of municipal investment bonds.By collecting the urban investment bond data of 286 prefecture-level and above cities from 2008 to 2015,using a two-way fixed effect model to conduct an empirical analysis on how the bias of local government fiscal expenditures affects the issuance of urban investment bonds.The following research conclusions are confirmed:(1)The estimation results of the two-way fixed-effect model show that the fiscal expenditure bias significantly promotes the issuance of municipal investment bonds.When the degree of fiscal expenditure bias increases by 1%,the municipal investment bond issuance will be increased by 1.1974%,and the above the research conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests.(2)The results of the analysis of regional heterogeneity show that the bias of fiscal expenditure in the eastern region significantly promotes the issuance of urban investment bonds,but there is no significant effect in the eastern and western regions;the results of local financial heterogeneity analysis show that fiscal expenditure bias is in the financial The more abundant areas did not have a significant impact on the issuance of municipal investment bonds,but in regions with weaker financial resources,it significantly promoted the issuance of urban investment bonds;the analysis of the age heterogeneity of officials shows that the fiscal expenditures tend to promote the issuance of municipal investment bonds It only exists in cities where the secretary of the municipal party committee is younger than 55 years old,and is not significant in cities where the secretary of the municipal party committee is older than 55 years old.The expenditure bias significantly promotes the issuance of municipal investment bonds,while in areas with low construction intensity in the development zone,the fiscal expenditure bias has no significant impact on the issuance of municipal investment bonds.(3)Although all regression models in this paper use a two-way fixed-effect model,which can alleviate the problem of missing variables to a certain extent,there are still unavoidable unobservable factors that also affect fiscal expenditure bias and municipal investment bond issuance.In addition,considering that there may be a two-way causal problem between the fiscal expenditure bias and the issue of municipal investment bonds,on the one hand,this paper uses provincial-level fiscal expenditure bias data for estimation;on the other hand,it selects other prefecturelevel cities in the province where the prefecture-level city is located.The annual average of the city 's fiscal expenditure bias is used as an instrumental variable,and it is estimated using two-stage least squares(2SLS).It is found that the fiscal expenditure bias still significantly promotes the issuance of municipal investment bonds.(4)The income from land sales as the free disposable income of local governments has played an important role in easing local financing constraints.Taking into account that there may be a substitution effect between land transfer income and municipal investment debt,we further add the land transfer and fiscal expenditure bias interaction items to estimate based on the benchmark regression model.It has promoted the effect of fiscal expenditure bias on the issuance of municipal investment bonds.In addition,we divided the sample into two sub-samples of larger land sales scale and smaller land sales scale for estimation according to the average and median land sales income.There is no significant impact on municipal investment bonds,but in areas where the scale of land transfers is small,the fiscal expenditure bias has significantly promoted the issuance of municipal investment bonds.The above estimation results initially confirmed that there may be a substitution effect between land transfer income and municipal investment bonds.5.The influence of fiscal expenditure bias on land transfer.By collecting land transfer data from 286 prefecture-level cities and above in 2008-2016,this paper further empirically analyzed the impact of local government fiscal expenditure bias on land transfer.The following research conclusions are confirmed:(1)The estimation results using the two-way fixed-effect model show that regardless of whether land transfer income or land transfer area is used as the explanatory variable,the local government fiscal expenditure bias significantly promotes land transfer.Among them,when fiscal expenditures tend to increase by 1%,land transfer income and land transfer area increase by 0.6586% and 0.5755%,respectively.(2)The results of regional heterogeneity analysis show that the effect of fiscal expenditure bias on the issuance of municipal investment bonds only exists in the central region,and it is not significant in the eastern and western regions;the results of local financial heterogeneity analysis show that the fiscal expenditure bias is in financial resources The more abundant areas did not have a significant impact on the issuance of municipal investment bonds,but in regions with weaker financial resources,it significantly promoted the issuance of municipal investment bonds;the results of the heterogeneity analysis of officials showed that the fiscal expenditure bias only promoted the issuance of municipal investment bonds.Exist in cities where the secretary of the municipal party committee is less than 55 years old,but not significant in cities where the secretary of the municipal party committee is older than 55 years;the heterogeneity analysis results of the construction intensity of the development zone show that in areas with high construction intensity of the development zone,financial expenditure The bias significantly promotes land transfers,while in areas with low construction intensity in the development zone,the fiscal expenditure bias has no significant impact on land transfers.(3)Although all the regression models in this paper use a two-way fixedeffect model,which can alleviate the problem of missing variables to a certain extent,there are still unobservable factors that affect the fiscal expenditure bias and land transfer at the same time,taking into account the fiscal expenditure bias and land transfer There may be a two-way causal problem,so in addition to using the provinciallevel fiscal expenditure bias data for estimation,this paper further selects the annual average of the fiscal expenditure bias degree of other prefecture-level cities in the province where the prefecture-level city is located as an instrumental variable.Using two-stage least squares(2SLS)for estimation,it was found that whether using provincial-level data or instrumental variables for estimation,the fiscal expenditure bias significantly promoted land transfer.(4)Municipal investment bonds,as the free disposable income of local governments,have played an important role in easing local financing constraints.Considering that there may be a substitution relationship between land transfer income and municipal investment bonds,further adding urban investment bonds and fiscal expenditure bias interaction terms to estimate on the basis of the benchmark regression model,the results show that the interaction term estimation coefficient is significantly negative,indicating that municipal investment Debt weakened the promotion effect of fiscal expenditure bias on land transfer,and confirmed the substitution effect between land transfer income and municipal investment debt.In addition,we divided the sample into two sub-samples based on the average amount of municipal investment bond issuance divided into larger municipal investment bond issuance scale and smaller municipal investment bond issuance scale.The fiscal expenditure bias has no significant effect on land transfers.In areas where the scale of municipal investment bond issuance is small,the fiscal expenditure bias significantly promotes the expansion of the land transfer scale.There may be substitution effects.6.Expansion analysis.Considering that the non-people's livelihood expenditure has a greater pulling effect on economic growth than the people's livelihood expenditure,the local government may have a strategy of interactive competition in favor of non-people's livelihood expenditure.In order to test whether local governments have fiscal expenditure biased competition behavior,the results of further spatial correlation tests show that:(1)Whether the global spatial correlation test or the local spatial correlation test shows that the Moran's index(Moran's I)is significantly positive In terms of fiscal expenditure bias,local governments have high-high and lowlow spatial agglomeration characteristics,confirming that there is imitation of strategic interactive competition among local governments in fiscal expenditure bias.(2)After confirming the existence of fiscal spending bias strategy interactive competition among local governments,this paper further builds spatial autoregressive model(SAR),spatial autocorrelation model(SAC),spatial error model(SEM)and spatial Durbin model(SDM)estimation,in the spatial measurement model using geographic adjacency weight matrix,geographic distance weight matrix,economic distance weight matrix and administrative adjacency weight matrix,the estimation results show that the imitation strategy interactive competition behavior of fiscal expenditure bias is significant Promoted the issuance of municipal investment bonds and land transfers.(3)The estimation results of spatial autoregressive model,spatial autocorrelation model,spatial error model and spatial Doberman model show that the space in the estimation results of the model using geographic distance weight matrix,economic distance weight matrix and administrative neighbor weight matrix The autocorrelation coefficients(rho)are significantly positive,indicating that there is a "comparative behavior" in the issuance of municipal investment bonds and land transfers between local governments with similar geographical distances,similar economic development levels,and local governments in the same province(autonomous region).The issuance of municipal investment bonds and land transfers between regions(geographical distance,economic distance,and administrative proximity)have a stimulating effect on the region.There is a positive space spillover effect between municipal investment bonds and land transfers. |
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