A Sequential Auction Of Complements For Pricing The Construction Land Quota

In consideration of social stability,farmland protection and other public interests,the central government strictly controls the total amount of construction land quota to each region.However,with the advancement of urbanization and the development of social economy,the demand for urban land continues to rise,and the supply of the quota is insufficient.Meanwhile,with the transformation of social and economic forms,rural labor is flooding into cities and towns on a large scale,and there is a large scale of the rural land which is idle.For that reason,local governments encourage farmers to abandon their idle homesteads and reclaim them as the qualified agricultural land to generate additional land quotas.However,the current pricing mechanism based on the reclamation cost of construction land is not enough to guarantee the land rights and interests of farmers in the process of homesteads withdrawal,and it cannot really encourage farmers to voluntarily withdraw from their idle homesteads.Therefore,this study uses the sequential auction of complements,numerical simulation and other methods to design a reasonable pricing mechanism for the construction land quota,so as to improve the enthusiasm of farmers for reclamation and increase the supply of the quota,alleviate the current shortage of urban land and a large number of idle rural land,and effectively guarantee the orderly development of the country and society.Firstly,according to the complementary characteristics between the construction land quota and construction land,as well as the main characteristics in the practice of construction land quota,we improve the classic sequential auction of complements under the first price sealed-bid auction,and use it for pricing the construction land quota.Then we explore the key factors influencing the bidding price of the construction land quota,construction land and the farmers’ expected income,and present the above results intuitively through the numerical simulation.According to the relevant conclusions,we design a reasonable pricing mechanism of the construction land quota.Secondly,according to the transaction rules of the construction land quota,we consider the government’s land price deduction rule(i.e.the price deduction rule),and use the sequential auction of complements under the first price sealed-bid auction by considering the price deduction rule for pricing the construction land quota.On this basis,we analyze the core factors influencing the bidding price of the construction land quota,construction land and the farmers’ expected income through theoretical and case analysis,and further explore whether the price deduction rule can further stimulate the enthusiasm of farmers to voluntarily withdraw and reclaim their idle homesteads.Finally,considering the low efficiency quota landing of the construction land quota,we introduce the improved sequential auction of complements under the second price sealed-bid auction,and construct the improved sequential auction of complements under the first and second price sealed-bid auction,and then apply them to the construction land quota pricing.On this basis,we obtain the bidding price of the construction land quota,construction land and the farmers’ expected income under the two rules of auction through theoretical and case analysis.Through comparative analysis,we find which auction mode can improve the implementation efficiency of construction land quota to a greater extent,and finally design a reasonable construction land quota pricing mechanism.The results show that: Firstly,the bidding price of the construction land quota and the farmers’ expected income decrease with the increase of the number of bidders,and increase with the increase of the fee for idle land.The biding price of the construction land increases with the increase of the number of bidders,while the construction land quotation of bidders who do not obtain the construction land quota decreases with the increase of the fee for idle land.Secondly,the price deduction rule can improve the bidders’ construction land quota and construction land quotation.The larger the amount of price deduction,the higher the quotation of the construction land quota and construction land.Meanwhile,the price deduction can also improve the farmers’ expected income,and it will increase with the increase of the deduction amount.Thirdly,the bidding price of construction land quota and construction land under the second price sealed-bid auction is higher than that under the first price sealed-bid auction,and the bidder who gets the construction land quota has a higher probability of obtaining the construction land.Therefore,the second price sealed-bid auction can not only encourage the bidders to raise their bids,but also improve the efficiency of quota and land use,and better play the role of transaction mechanism of construction land quota.This paper has the following theoretical and methodological innovations:Firstly,this paper innovatively introduces the sequential auction of complements to price the construction land quota.Different from the research on the existing pricing mechanism of construction land quota,this study takes the construction land quota and construction land as the complementary goods to study simultaneously,instead of studying separately.In addition,this study also points out that the main function of construction land quota is to ensure the development of construction land in advance,and its intrinsic value is the additional time value brought by the development of construction land in advance.Secondly,according to the characteristics of China’s construction land quota transaction practice,the classical sequential auction of complements is improved.Different from the classic sequential auction model of complements,according to the characteristics of construction land quota transaction practice,this study believes that the losers during the first stage will reduce the valuation of the goods during the second stage.In reality,the total return of the investment projects carried out by the developers using these two goods is fixed.If the developer fails to obtain the first-stage goods successfully,it is more realistic to lower the valuation of the second-stage goods.In addition,the use of auction to reveal the real value of construction land quota also expands the application practice of the sequential auction model of complements.Thirdly,this paper studies the construction land quota pricing mechanism and its influence on the price under the trading rules,such as the price deduction,the utilization efficiency of the quotaDifferent from the existing studies on the transactions of the construction land quota,this study explors the bidders’ bidding strategies of construction land quota from the perspective of transaction rules such as the price deduction and the utilization efficiency of the quota,as well as the impact of these trading rules on bidding,so as to alleviate the difficulties of quota supply shortage and landing in practice in various regions.