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The Research On Principal-Agent Theory For Sharing Economy Platform Based On Both Explicit And Implicit Contracts

Posted on:2020-04-26Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:S G DaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1489306497963839Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the sharing economy has developed into an important part of our country's economy.The sharing economy has expanded from the transfer of enterprise ownership and the sharing of the right to use enterprise or personal goods to the re-optimization and efficient allocation of all social resources,forming a series of business models that make full use of resources.As a new type of business,the theoretical essence of "sharing economy" is the collaborative sharing of ownership,right of use and right of distribution of capital.Therefore,sharing economy requires us to study the economic contract and psychological contract relationship between participants of sharing economy platform from the perspective of interest distribution and incentive mechanism design,so as to stimulate the vitality and creativity of participants of sharing economy and ensure the stable and sustainable development of sharing economy platform.At present,the related research work of interest distribution and incentive mechanism design has become increasingly mature,but in the field of sharing economy,there are many problems that need to be studied.It is mainly reflected in the following aspects: The design of restraint incentive mechanism is mainly based on principal-agent theory and psychological contract theory,but the existing research on principal-agent theory and psychological contract theory is mainly focused on the traditional organizational form of "enterprise + employee" of enterprises,without considering the organizational form of "platform + individual" of shared economic platform and the new characteristics of the legal relationship of participants,and sharing the traditional incentives under the economic model.There will be corresponding difficulties and discomforts in the restraint mechanism.In this paper,incentive mechanism is designed to seek solutions to these problems,using the principal-agent theory,the psychological contract theory,the theory of rational behavior,reputation effect theory,dynamic programming theory,mechanism design theory and method.The main study around the following aspects:(1)The characteristics of the platform sharing economic organization relationship,analysis platform sharing economy system of each participation main body between the dominant bidirectional principal-agent relationship and the recessive psychological contract.(2)Introduction on behalf of sharing the interests of the whole economic system of the third party virtual client,sharing economic platform for multilateral constraint principal-agent model is set up,the analysis of information symmetry and information asymmetry under the condition of general solution of the model.(3)Combining with the psychological contract theory,the research hypothesis Shared economic platform is established on the basis of psychological contract behavior model,combined with the questionnaire survey and data analysis to verify this model.(4)Recessive psychological will consider the contract design,build based on dominant multilateral constraint bidirectional principal-agent and sharing of the recessive psychological contract economic platform dual contract basic model,the reputation effect model,considering the dual contract based on reputation effect of Shared economic platform dual contract multi-stage repeated game model,the formation of long-term incentive and short-term incentive combination incentive mode.(5)Design sharing economic platform incentive mechanism based on both explicit and implicit contracts,which can prevent "free riding" and "ratchet effect",solving the individual interests and group interests are possible inconsistencies.
Keywords/Search Tags:Sharing Economy, Two-Way Principal-Agent, Psychological Contract, Reputation Effect, Mechanism Design
PDF Full Text Request
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