Bank Credit Contract Design Under The Principal-agent Model

The socialist market economy has been booming after the reform and opening up.The state encourages public enterprises for the survival through the economy,the law and the necessary administrative methods,meanwhile the supply chain finance model became more and more perfect.However,there still exist some problems in this process,especially in the contract design between banks and small-sized enterprises.The operation model of supply chain financial based on principal-agent theory provides the method and direction for solving these problems.In this paper,we used the quantitated method to research the problems about how to the design credit contract for bank,and how to avoid the moral hazard through the principa-agent theory and supply chain finance theory.And the main contents and conclusions are as follows:(1)Under the background of certain situations,which involve the improving the profits and reducing the investment risk of bank,reviewing and distinguishing the credit level of loan enterprises,we established the bank credit contract model with punishment mechanism by comparing the utility between the symmetry and asymmetry information,so as to give the credit contract model of enterprises to bank under different credit levels.The research shows that,only when the difference of enterprise with different credit level in the opportunity utility is greater than a certain value,the low credit level enterprise has enthusiasm for counterfeiting the high credit level enterprise.Compare with the credit contract under the condition of symmetry,bank can appropriately increase the loan amount for high credit enterprises to attract them to come to the loan.At the same time,it can increase the punishment of lying to low credit companies.However,when the difference of opportunity utility between the two types of credit level of enterprise is relatively larger,in order to prevent the low credit enterprise lie,in addition to increase the punishment of lying,but also it will provide low loan interest rate to low credit companies compared to the situation of information symmetry in order to encourage low credit level enterprise to repay loans.(2)The moral hazard avoidance model was built through the introduction of the punishment mechanism,which can solve the problems about the collaborate between the borrowing enterprises and the third logistics enterprises to cheat the bank under the asymmetric information.The study shows that the third-party logistics companies will abide the contract when the bank's punishments are serious and the interests offered by enterprises are less attractive.On the contrary,the situation will change.And the penalty parameters will affect the decision of third-party logistics enterprises.