Research On The Influence Of Chinese Style Decentralization On Local Government's Behavior Of Supporting Agriculture

Institution is a kind of rule to encourage and restrict people's behavior.Chinese style decentralization system is regarded as a key institutional arrangement that leads to the miracle of China's economic growth because it gives the right incentives to local governments.However,the current vertical fiscal and tax return has gradually been unable to meet the expenditure needs of the "growth" government,and the dual incentive effect of tax sharing reform in economy and politics is weakening;in the process of the interaction between the upper and lower levels under the constraint of retaining political authority,the decentralization system is more inclined to the horizontal interaction between the local governments at the same level,which has been accompanied by the increase of extra budgetary revenue in the past decade It's more and more obvious.After the decentralization of supporting agriculture,the role of local governments in the field of regional supporting agriculture has become more and more important.However,facts and phenomena show that the western classical decentralization theory can not reasonably explain the current supporting agriculture behavior of local governments in China.China's unique political,economic and cultural background has a unique impact on the mechanism of decentralization system,and whether this impact can reasonably encourage local governments to support the comprehensive development of local agricultural economy is worth studying.Therefore,this paper attempts to build a mechanism of the influence of the Chinese style decentralization system on the behavior of local government supporting agriculture,hoping to optimize the design of the decentralization system so as to optimize the behavior of local government supporting agriculture,and finally achieve the purpose of X promoting the sustainable,healthy and stable development of China's agricultural economy.Following the basic logic of theoretical research,empirical research and policy research,this paper divides Chinese decentralization into three dimensions: revenue Decentralization(horizontal),expenditure Decentralization(vertical)and management Decentralization(market).Among them,from the perspective of horizontal economic revenue game between local governments,revenue decentralization discusses the different influence mechanisms of budgetary revenue(fiscal decentralization)and extra budgetary revenue(financial decentralization);while expenditure decentralization studies from the perspective of decentralization of agricultural support,information feedback mechanism and performance evaluation indicators between central and local governments;finally,management decentralization focuses on decentralization This paper analyzes the interference and management boundary between local government and market.By refining the research scope of Chinese decentralization system,this paper reveals the internal mechanism and influence mode of decentralization system on local government's behavior of supporting agriculture,and constructs a theoretical framework for the following empirical study.In the empirical research stage,this paper first carries out the basic deduction and analysis of the core variables through descriptive statistics,and then uses the 2008-2018 panel data,and uses the fixed effect model,threshold regression model,panel quantile model,panel Granger causality test,spatial econometric model and mediating effect model to verify the previous theoretical mechanism.Through theoretical analysis and empirical test,this paper puts forward the following conclusions(1)Income decentralization will lead to the soft constraint behavior of local government's agricultural budget?At present,irresponsible financial assistance weakens the incentive mechanism of vertical fiscal decentralization,but strengthens the ability of horizontal financial resources competition.The fiscal decentralization model of the federal system is not suitable for the local government's support for agriculture under the current irresponsible financial assistance in China.Under the leadership of the "big government" with highly political centralization of the central government,the vertical fiscal and tax incentive effect based on VAT return is weakened,while the local government can strengthen its financial resource capacity through horizontal fiscal control.?The convergence of the objective function of the central and local governments in supporting agriculture reduces the financial constraints.At the same time,the extra budgetary revenue competition of financial revenue decentralization strengthens the local government's ability of financial support for agriculture,but this ability comes from the external transfer of financial risk and the central implicit guarantee.By means of cost spillover and risk transfer,local governments can transfer the cost and risk of their own extra budgetary constraint expansion to the superior or the same level governments,so as to strengthen their ability to obtain financial resources.?In the process of strengthening local government's economic capacity,the ability of supporting agriculture is greater than its real demand.Through theoretical and game analysis,it shows that,first,the horizontal financial transfer formed by irresponsible financial assistance will lead to the increase of the scale of financial support for agriculture among local governments.Local governments in high-income decentralized areas will take the initiative to increase the scale of financial support for agriculture,and give priority to meet their own agricultural needs before being transferred;while local governments in low-income decentralized areas will rely on the central government and the governments at the same level on the basis of "competing for funds and projects" in agriculture.Second,on the basis of "risk shifting",local governments expand the constraints of non budgetary support for agriculture,and enhance the horizontal competition of non budgetary income(financial resources),so as to blindly expand the constraints of non budgetary financial support for agriculture.The empirical results show that there are obvious regional differences in the soft constraint behavior of agricultural budget caused by income decentralization.The expansion effect of financial support for agriculture budget constraint is more obvious in the eastern and western regions where there is a transfer payment relationship,while the expansion effect of financial support for agriculture budget constraint is more obvious in the central and western regions,which indicates that local governments will make up for the lack of financial support for agriculture by controlling financial funds when the budget is insufficient.The test results also show that the impact of income decentralization on the scale of supporting agriculture has obvious double threshold XII effect.Moderate income decentralization can promote the increase of local scale of supporting agriculture,but too high or too low income decentralization can reduce the promotion of scale of supporting agriculture.The above results also show that the current scale of local government's agricultural support funds is mainly affected by the horizontal economic game between governments and their ability to support agriculture,rather than meeting the needs of local agricultural economic development.(2)Decentralization of expenditure will lead to the performance oriented behavior of local governments in supporting agriculture?At present,the decentralization of expenditure does not balance the information gap between the central and local governments.Information transmission can only be from the top to the bottom,but not from the bottom to the top.Due to the restriction of registered residence system and rural cultural tradition,villagers' benefit subjects are unable to use "voting by feet" or "voting by hand" to feedback local governments' achievements and satisfaction with the construction of agriculture,rural areas and farmers.The failure of information feedback in rural areas to serve the local government has led to a deviation in the application of principal agent model in rural areas,which has weakened the decentralization of expenditure.Vertical incentive effect.?The central government's index assessment changes from selectivity to uniqueness,and the increase of expenditure decentralization will aggravate the degree of deviation,and eventually lead to the performance oriented behavior of local governments.Due to the lack of effective information feedback and performance appraisal methods in the current expenditure decentralization system,local governments face excessive competition in the face of superior government appraisal.?The one-way transmission of information weakens the role of local governments in optimizing regional service supply through horizontal competition,while the indicator assessment method of superior departments strengthens the vertical incentive effect of expenditure decentralization.Therefore,the completion of the assessment indicators of the superior government has become the only way of feedback on the performance of local government's regional support for agriculture;as a result,the local government will pursue short-term performance on the one hand,and pay more attention to "visibility" performance investment in rural public affairs on the other hand,and finally form performance oriented behavior.The empirical results show that: decentralization leads local governments to follow the "visualization" priority investment orientation in rural investment and public service supply,pay more attention to the "visualization" indicators that are easy to be found by the superior government assessment,and insufficient investment in the "non visualization" indicators that are not easy to be valued by the promotion assessment.Through impulse response and variance decomposition,it is found that the impact effect of decentralization of expenditure on "short-term" investment of supporting agriculture behavior rapidly converges to zero in four lag periods,which indicates that the local government's performance oriented behavior of supporting agriculture fails to form a long-term stable support for rural investment and construction,and the impact of this short-term behavior on "visualization" index lags behind much earlier.In addition,the empirical results show that the current financial funds are more effective for the long-term and sustainable supply of rural services.(3)The decentralization of management will result in the segmentation of local government's market supporting agriculture?In China,the relationship between agricultural government and market is obviously "strong government" and "weak market".Under this institutional arrangement,local governments will adopt a more comprehensive intervention system for agricultural management.At this time,the management and intervention of management Decentralization for agricultural economic development did not effectively promote its marketization process,but promoted the market segmentation behavior among regions;this kind of intervention not only failed to eliminate "market failure",but led to "policy failure".?The main influence mechanism of management decentralization is that the local government has obvious regional boundary isolation in supporting agriculture affairs,and the boundary of supporting agriculture behavior of local government is not clear,and the function is uncertain.At the same time,the administrative intervention and local protection are carried out on the current regional agricultural commodity market and agricultural production factor market.At the same time,the fuzzy boundary of the local government's behavior of supporting agriculture leads to the lack of restriction.In the choice of "fighting on their own" and promoting the local agricultural economic growth,the local government breaks through the boundary restriction of management XIV decentralization,forms the market protection for the regional agricultural development,and finally forms the market segmentation behavior in many fields of agriculture.The empirical results show that: first,the impact of decentralization mechanism between local government and market management.The test results show that the regional agricultural commodity market has formed a regional market segmentation,which shows the significant and convergence of morani value in the region,indicating that the market segmentation of agricultural commodity market has formed a certain regional aggregation and some horizontal alliances of local governments;at the same time,after passing the Lagrange multiplier test,the spatial lag model regression result table is used The decentralization of local government management had a significant impact on the segmentation of agricultural commodity market in Ming Dynasty.The second is to use the intermediary effect model to test the impact path of management decentralization and local government market segmentation behavior.The empirical results show that the scale of provincial agricultural production will affect the impact effect of management decentralization and play a positive role in promoting;that is,the market segmentation behavior of management decentralization in agricultural production provinces will be more obvious.In this paper,the characteristics of Chinese decentralization system outline the characteristics of local government's behavior in supporting agriculture from different dimensions,describe the comprehensive behavior of supporting agriculture based on the willingness of supporting agriculture based on game,supply and service subject to performance,lack of cooperation in agricultural management,and construct the comprehensive behavior mechanism of supporting agriculture of local government under the current decentralization system.Based on the above research results,this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions and optimization scheme for the existing problems of decentralization in China.Finally,compared with the existing research,the innovation and contribution of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:(1)Refinement and expansion of the research dimension of Chinese style decentralization system?In the past,the research on the decentralization system mainly focused on the vertical tax return.On this basis,this paper divides the research scope of Chinese decentralization into three dimensions: revenue decentralization,expenditure decentralization and management decentralization.Three different dimensions depict the different influence mechanism of the decentralization system in the horizontal and vertical game and agricultural policy,which is an effective refinement of the current decentralization system research.?In the past,the study of decentralization system paid more attention to the influence mechanism of decentralization within the budget.On this basis,this paper emphasizes the game influence mechanism of extra budgetary decentralization among local governments,and emphasizes the strengthening mechanism of extra budgetary revenue and expenditure Decentralization(financial decentralization)between local governments on the ability of local governments to write economic resources.Through this mechanism,the explanation defects of classical decentralization theory under the "Limited resources hypothesis" are improved.The addition of extra budgetary decentralization system is an in-depth explanation of the "spiral" fiscal financial decentralization influence mechanism and an effective expansion of the current decentralization influence mechanism.(2)On the expansion of the explanation of the local government's behavior of supporting agriculture?This paper emphasizes the game influence mechanism of horizontal economic interaction between local governments.This paper is not only limited to the view of "urbanization tendency" of government investment formed by tax return in vertical decentralization theory,but also focuses on describing the impact of horizontal irresponsible financial transfer game and financial competition on the scale of supporting agriculture.This paper puts forward that the scale of local government supporting agriculture is the result of the comprehensive influence of "supporting agriculture ability" and "supporting agriculture demand",and explains the problem of regional scale deviation of supporting agriculture from the perspective of decentralization.?This paper explains the reasons for the deviation of rural investment structure caused by decentralization of expenditure from the perspective of one-way information transmission mechanism,which is not limited to the traditional views such as "productive orientation" or "GDP orientation",but also explains the influence of "visualization behavior" and "short-term behavior" on rural investment structure from the perspective of performance orientation.?From the theoretical analysis of decentralization system and market segmentation behavior,this paper focuses on the non cooperative game analysis between "strong government" and "weak market" in the agricultural field,and explains that agricultural market segmentation is more serious than other markets.(3)Empirical index innovation of Chinese decentralizationThe traditional index design of decentralization system is generally limited to the horizontal and vertical index design with fiscal decentralization as the core,and the calculation of extra budgetary revenue is generally replaced by the extra budgetary revenue in the financial Yearbook.On this basis,this paper uses the financial decentralization index to replace the local government's extra budgetary income index,which can better reflect the local government's horizontal economic interaction and extra budgetary economic game mechanism in supporting agriculture;the use and calculation of the financial expenditure decentralization index can reveal the local government's control over local financial institutions,which can be used in the current index measurement of the decentralization system It is rare in calculation.