A Study On The Impact Of Local Land Finance Behavior On House Price Under The Background Of Chinese Style Decentralization

Decentralization is the governance model,which a superpower must adopt.The institutional arrangement of Chinese style decentralization,which provides a continuous incentive for the local government to promoting economic growth,is considered as the root cause of China's economic development.The closely combining between fiscal decentralization and political centralization produced the true incentives of local governments to implement land fiscal behavior.The fiscal decentralization induced local government to increase fiscal revenue.Through land granting,local government obtain the land granting income and related tax to supplement the local finance.The political centralization induced local government to compete for growth.Through arranging the land fiscal revenue on economics public goods preferentially,which is represented by infrastructure,local government could access to short-term economic growth and win the political performance examination,which is focus on economic growth.The closely combining between fiscal decentralization and political centralization induce local government to implement a positive land fiscal behavior.On the one hand,the local government get local finance expansion through land revenue behavior,and acquire high speed of economic growth through land expenditure behavior.On the other hand,the land revenue behavior and expenditure behavior had brought many negative issues,such as excessive investment in real estate,expenditure structure bias and high housing prices.Against on the background above,this paper investigates the local governments ' land fiscal behaviors' logistics under the fiscal decentralization and political centralization,and whether the behaviors affect the housing price,which is based on the Fiscal decentralization theory and promotion tournament theory.Then,using econometric method,an empirical research will be taken,which Select China provincial-level administrative region as empirical research object,to empirically theoretical analysis.The construction of the paper is as follows:Firstly,based on the review of related literature domestic and abroad,this paper will analysis what incentives will the institutional arrangements of Chinese style decentralization have on local governments,and choice of the land fiscal behavior,and the effects on housing prices.Then,according to the analytical paradigm of motivation-behavior-effect,this paper will establish a framework,which describe the logical relationship between local governments' land fiscal behavior and housing prices.Secondly,based on the framework,this paper will demonstrate the function mechanism of local governments' land fiscal behavior to housing prices,through the dimensions of local governments' land revenue behaviors and land expenditure behaviors.Thirdly,this paper will make an empirical analysis with panel data of 30 provinces nationwide to examine the theoretical analysis above,which use the estimation technology of static data model and dynamic data model synthetically.The results shows that,the land revenue behaviors brought the expansion of land fiscal revenue,and have a significant positive impact on housing prices.The land expenditure behavior make twisted structure of local public finance expenditure structure,and have a significant positive impact on housing prices.Finally,based on the results of theoretical and empirical analysis,some policy recommendations are concluded:promote the institution of land management;reform the fiscal and taxation institution;reform the political performance evaluation system.