Research On The Motivation Of Information Disclosure Violation And The Economic Consequences Of Supervision Penalty Of Chinese Listed Companies

Since the 2008 financial crisis,the issue of corporate capital market information disclosure violations has attracted the attention and research of a large number of scholars.Existing research has focused on mature capital markets such as the United States,and little has been seen in other countries.In fact,the motivation of corporate information disclosure violations and the economic consequences of their regulatory penalties are discussed in different contexts,which is of great theoretical and practical significance for promoting research and innovation.As a new country with economies in transition,China's rapid development of capital markets,immature environment and imperfect legal system all herald the study of independent exploration of the situation in China is a realistic need.The special equity structure dominated by state-owned holdings in China's listed companies is different from that of western developed countries.In addition,the government-led economic system reform permeates many aspects of enterprise decision-making.Therefore,at the level of the characteristics of corporate property rights,the research on the motivation and results of strategic information disclosure of state-owned enterprises in China has very Chinese characteristics.In the characteristic level of market transaction,it originates from the unique social system environment of China,and the listed companies in China prefer the relational trading mode,which is significantly different from the Western capital market,which is composed mainly of the listed companies which are run by marketization.Moreover,with the Western developed capital market to bond-based financing methods there are typical differences,although with the rapid development of China's capital market,China's enterprises are listed enterprises in the external financing is still dominated by credit financing,banks are the main investors of listed companies,which is also very important to observe the market effect of securities supervision penalty from the perspective of credit decision of bank creditor investors.This paper selects the performance appraisal reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises,the relationship trading mode of Chinese enterprises and the three scenes of Chinese enterprise bank debt financing to investigate the causes of corporate information disclosure irregularities and the economic consequences of regulatory penalties,whether it is the choice of research perspective or the combination with the background of Chinese system,this paper provided research on the practice of securities supervision in the Chinese context for the academic community.The main conclusions and enlightenment are as follows:(1)Decentralization,strengthening the systematic,holistic and coordinated reform is conducive to the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.This paper finds that although the performance appraisal reform based on EVA strengthens the sensitivity of executive compensation and performance of state-owned enterprises,it does not produce the expected incentive and restraint effect,and relieves the opportunistic behavior of the executives of state-owned enterprises.After the implementation of EVA examination,state-owned enterprises have more information disclosure irregularities,which is mainly because the characteristics of the administrative system of state-owned enterprises distort the incentive mechanism of pay contract,and some state-owned enterprise executives induce opportunistic behavior because of insufficient incentive.The research of this paper reveals the institutional factors of "cold" in EVA assessment system,and provides empirical evidence for the further extensive and in-depth implementation of EVA assessment,and further provides policy reference for the reform of authorized management system and executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in state-owned enterprises.At the same time,the research of this paper has added empirical evidence from the Chinese market to the study of the causality between "performance appraisal and Enterprise information Disclosure" by scholars at home and abroad.(2)In order to meet the needs of suppliers or customers,relational transactions may promote corporate information disclosure violations.Relational transactions with suppliers/customers do not inhibit but promote corporate information disclosure violations,exacerbating the company's "non-governance" performance.In groups with lower bargaining power in enterprises,this "non-governance" performance is even more pronounced.The existing research holds that the company entrustment agency contradiction,capital market refinancing and stock market shell motive are the main inducement of information disclosure violation of Chinese listed companies,this paper excludes these factors,and discovers the new inducement of information disclosure violation of Chinese listed companies from the perspective of inter-firm relations.In fact,from 2007 to 2017,China's capital market made a number of adjustments to the regulation of supply chain information disclosure.In this paper,through the enterprise delay disclosure,false statements,major omissions and other information disclosure irregularities,with explicit negative events to give the enterprise and supplier/customer relationship impact accounting information disclosure of direct evidence,which expands the supply chain relationship impact on corporate behavior understanding,Provided direct evidence support for the SEC's information disclosure supervision on the dimension of supply chain relationship.(3)The notice of securities supervision penalty has spillover effect on the allocation of credit market resources.The "Bad News" released by the SEC's penalty announcement has a risk early warning effect,which may lead to a decline in the financing of the bank debt of the offending company.Analyst tracking has an information effect,which is conducive to increasing the transparency of the Company's information and may alleviate the relationship between the SEC penalty announcement and the corporate bank debt financing;Analyst tracking has a reputational effect that could expand the reputational losses of offending companies and affect the relationship between SEC penalty announcements and corporate bank debt financing.The empirical test shows that after the SEC penalty announcement,the probability of bank loan signing,the signing rate of bank loan and the scale of new bank loan of the offending company are significantly reduced,and the higher the penalty level,the more significant the decline of bank debt financing.The Bank expects the information cost of the offending company to rise with the risk of default,and the deterioration of the non-real corporate financial position is the main reason that affects the reduction of corporate bank debt financing.The information effect,rather than the reputational effect,tracked by analysts eased the negative relationship between the SEC penalty announcement and the corporate bank debt financing.Under the background of strengthening supervision of China's capital market,this paper examines the economic consequences of the SEC penalty announcement for the financing of bank debt of offending companies.The literature of the economic consequences of capital market supervision and punishment,the existing research mainly focuses on the securities market,the discovery of this paper has opened a new perspective for the evaluation of the economic consequences of capital market supervision and punishment.(4)This research is instructive to policy makers,standard designers and regulatory implementers: 1)Reduces government intervention and the policy burden of state-owned enterprises,and reduces the distortion of the incentive and restraint of administrative factors on state-owned enterprise executives,which may be a problem that must be solved in the reform of state-owned enterprises.Under the new situation,strengthening the systematization,integrity and coordination of reform will be beneficial to the high quality development of state-owned enterprises.2)Over the past decade,many countries have adopted international accounting standards and are working towards the harmonization of global reporting standards and disclosure standards.The pursuit of capital and the competition between capital market international have also triggered competition among securities regulators.To identify the “real effect” of accounting information disclosure from the company level,pay attention to the cost and benefit of information disclosure of different types of enterprises,pay attention to the real interest demands of information disclosure providers,and further evaluate the economic consequences of information disclosure and supervision punishment from the market level,which puts forward new requirements for the standard designers and regulatory implementers.3)Characteristics of information disclosure supervision practice in China's capital market:the model of reputation supervision under the leadership of government regulation.This paper find that China,as a typical emerging market country,under the rapid development of capital market,immature environment and imperfect legal system,China's securities supervision model also has market effect.Through the market(reputation)mechanism,give full play to the strength of other market participants(such as the creditor banks of listed companies),which is conducive to extending and strengthening the effectiveness of securities supervision.This can explain to some extent the reason why the weak foundation of China's securities market is booming.This also provides evidence support and empirical reference for capital market construction in other countries.