Research On The Influence Of Non-state Shareholders' Participation In Governance On Internal Control Information Disclosure Deviation Of State-owned Enterprise

Under the background of Mixed Ownership Reform,non-state shareholders' participation in state-owned enterprises can supervise and restrict management and state-owned shareholders,reduce governance defects such as "insider control" and excessive government intervention in state-owned enterprises,inject new production factors,especially human capital factors,which will help improve the decision-making quality of state-owned enterprises and improve the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.That is,the participation of non-state shareholders in governance can exert the effect of supervision,restraint and resource support to improve the corporate governance level and to promote the growth and development of state-owned enterprises.Listed companies are required to conduct self-evaluation of internal control by The Basic Norms for Enterprise Internal Control and the Supporting Guidelines for Enterprise Internal Control.However,under the weak internal and external governance environment in our country,the quality of internal control information disclosed by enterprises is low.There are deviations between the internal control information disclosed by enterprises and their actual internal control status,which comes from two aspects: one is the identification stage of internal control defects,in which enterprises fail to identify internal control defects timely,comprehensively and accurately;Second,in the stage of internal control information disclosure,there may be selective disclosure behaviors such as concealing or reducing the level of defects that have been identified.The above factors lead to the difference between the internal control information disclosed by enterprises and the actual internal control status,which affects the authenticity and accuracy of internal control information,causes information asymmetry between internal and external contractors,affects the allocation of resources in the capital market,damages the interests of small and medium-sized investors,and aggravates the instability of the capital market.There is a close relationship between corporate governance and information disclosure.The quality of information disclosure is related to the efficient operation of the corporate governance mechanism,while corporate governance affects the quality of information disclosure.Taking the deviation of internal control information disclosure as the starting point,this paper examines the impact of non-state shareholders' participation in state-owned enterprises on the behavior of internal control information disclosure from the perspectives of ownership structure and high-level governance.Specifically,the research focuses on the following issues:whether the participation of non-state shareholders in corporate governance can inhibit the deviation of internal control information disclosure in state-owned enterprises? What is the path and mechanism? Does the equity heterogeneity of state-owned enterprises affect the impact of non-state shareholders' participation in governance on internal control information disclosure deviation?In response to the above issues,the 2012-2019 Chinese capital market Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share state-owned listed companies were chosen as the research object.Based on the principal-agent theory,resource dependence theory,control theory and information disclosure theory,In-depth analysis of the governance effect of non-state shareholders,the causes of the deviation of internal control information disclosure,theoretical analysis and empirical test of the impact of non-state shareholders' participation in corporate governance on the deviation of internal control information disclosure,and the following conclusions are drawn:First,non-state shareholders,appointed directors,and over-appointed directors can restrain the deviation of internal control information disclosure,that is,non-state shareholders can influence the internal control information disclosure behavior of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of ownership structure and high-level governance.The higher shareholding ratio of private shareholders can effectively restrain the deviation of internal control information disclosure,while the shareholding of financial,foreign,natural and other types of shareholders has no obvious effect,and the higher the shareholding ratio of the largest non-state shareholder,the better it can restrain the deviation.The appointment of supervisors and managers by non-state shareholders also has the effect of restraining the deviation of internal control information disclosure.Second,the participation of non-state shareholders in governance can exert the effects of supervision and restraint and resource support,and affect the deviation of information disclosure of internal control of state-owned enterprises.From the perspective of supervision and constraint,non-state shareholders can optimize the supervisory function of the board of directors,thereby inhibiting managerial defense and further inhibiting the partial disclosure of internal control information;from the perspective of resource support,non-state shareholders' participation in governance can improve board capital and further inhibit internal control information disclosure deviation.The participation of non-state shareholders in governance can not only reduce the deviation of internal control information disclosure and improve the quality of internal control information disclosure,but also have an impact on the pre-factor of internal control information disclosure,that is,the identification standards for internal control defects,and promote the stricter identification standards for internal control defects.Thirdly,when state-owned capital maintains control over state-owned enterprises,non-state shareholders' participation in governance is more effective in inhibiting the deviation of internal control information disclosure;when non-state shareholders and state-owned shareholders can check and balance each other,the participation of non-state shareholders in governance is more effective in inhibiting the deviation of internal control information disclosure;The diversity of non-state shareholders' equity leads to differences in shareholders' business objectives and decision-making preferences,thus weakening the positive impact of non-state shareholders' participation in governance on internal control information disclosure;Compared with the ownership structure,the participation of non-state shareholders in high-level governance is more effective in inhibiting the deviation of internal control information disclosure.The contributions and possible innovations of this paper are as follows:First,this paper focuses on the research on the deviation of internal control information disclosure,and achieves innovation in the research perspective,variables and content.Existing researches on the influencing factors of internal control information disclosure often regard the internal control information disclosed by enterprises as their actual internal control status,ignoring the possible differences between the internal control information disclosed by enterprises and the actual internal control status.This paper focuses on the possible differences between the internal control information disclosed by the enterprise and the actual internal control status,and proposes the concept of internal control information disclosure deviation,which realizes the innovation of the research perspective.Considering that the company was punished by the China Securities Regulatory Commission for violations of regulations,the annual report was restated,and the certified public accountant issued an unqualified audit opinion on the financial report and internal control as the company's actual internal control defects.Comparing the disclosure status of internal control defects in the self-assessment of enterprise internal control with the above defects,two variables of internal control information disclosure deviation and deviation degree are constructed,which realizes the innovation of research variables.Starting from the identification and disclosure of internal control defects,the influencing factors of internal control information disclosure deviation are studied,and the innovation of the research content is realized.Secondly,this paper focuses on the research on the governance mode of non-state shareholders under the background of mixed ownership reform,explores the governance effect of non-state shareholders' shareholding from the dimensions of ownership structure and high-level governance,and compares the governance effects of ownership structure and high-level governance dimensions.Existing research mainly explores the effect of non-state shareholders' participation in governance from the single perspective of ownership structure or high-level governance.However,there are differences in the existing research on which dimension of ownership structure and senior governance is more effective.This paper examines the impact of non-state shareholders,appointed directors,and over-appointed directors on internal control information disclosure deviation,providing further evidence for the existing research.Finally,this paper constructs a research framework on the influence of non-state shareholders' participation in governance on internal control information disclosure,and conducts an in-depth discussion on the impact path and mechanism: based on the board's supervisory and consulting functions,on the one hand,from the perspective of supervisory and restraint effects,along the lines of non-state shareholders State-owned shareholder participation in governance—manager management defense— internal control information disclosure deviation.On the other hand,from the perspective of resource support effect,non-state shareholder participation in governance — board capital — internal control information disclosure deviation is studied.Innovation is achieved in the research framework.