The State-owned Nature Of Controlling Shareholders And The Quality Of Accounting Information:a Positive Study

The market-oriented reform with Chinese characteristics has left the imprint of planned economy in many aspects of our life. As to ownership structure, the highly concentration of ownership and the state-owned share dominance are the main problems we face today. The quality of accounting information is quite important in corporate governance academic research both domestic and abroad. A lot of papers have focused on the relationship between the quality of accounting information and the ownership structure. In a state dominating stock market, it nearly gets to a common conclusion that state-owned shareholders are not conducive for the protection of accounting information since state agents are not willing to supervise the management for the lack of proper incentives. In order to get benefits such as promotion, the administration would like to require the state-owned enterprise to accomplish something which might violate the direction of reform. If these events are disclosed, the administration will probably bear great political costs. In order to avoid the happening of these things, the government would interfere in the information disclosing, as a result, the information quality will be discounted. To inquire into the different impact on information quality of the controlling shareholders with different state-owned nature, this paper has divided state-owned nature of controlling shareholders into governments and SOE(state-owned enterprise), holding the opinion that the controlling shareholders with SOE nature will provide lower quality of accounting information than those listed corporations with government nature of controlling shareholders.The incentive to execute its powers is quite different when the state-owned controlling shareholders get different natures. When the listed companies’ controlling shareholders are SOEs, the supervisors to the management are professional agents, not the owner himself, also is not a client but an agent so that his interest is consistent with the management of the listed companies. With this analysis, the supervision to the management of the listed companies is the weakest when the controlling shareholders are SOEs. If the listed companies’reported performance is good enough, the supervisors and the listed companies’ management all win, they all get what they need leaving the financial reports unbelievable. Based on the logic and analysis above, this article consistChapter Ⅰ:Introductions. This paper begins by describing the background and meanings of this research, and then will introduce the idea and the logical clue of this article;Chapter Ⅱ:Literature review. At this section, the writer will make a simple and clean review on the ownership structure and the quality of accounting information both domestic and foreign, and then point out the most direction that deserve further study;Chapter Ⅲ:Theoretical analysis. This section begins with the definition of some basic concepts in this article, elaborates the principal-agent theory, and then move on to analyze the different affect of controlling shareholders with different state-owned nature.Chapter Ⅳ:Positive research design. In this section, the writer will build two different models to compare the difference impact on the quality of accounting information when the controlling shareholders get different state-owned natures.Chapter Ⅴ:The results and analysis. In this section, the author will carefully state how to select and deal with the samples, and then present the descriptive statistic and multivariate regression results employing STATA10.0.Chapter Ⅵ:Findings and inspirations. This section will get to a conclusion after the empirical study and point out the weakness in this research for the future study to improve.