Research On The Evolution Of Collective Cooperation Under Exit Mechanisms

In the current globalized economic environment,cooperation is seen as a crucial force driving global development and promoting shared prosperity.China actively fulfills the United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs)by advocating for the construction of a “global community of shared future” and global strategies like the “Belt and Road Initiative”,laying the foundation for achieving common prosperity.Against this backdrop,China is comprehensively advancing the rural revitalization strategy,considering cooperatives as a key driver for rural economic development and achieving shared prosperity.However,farmer cooperatives still face challenges such as cooperation dilemmas,insufficient income-generating capacity,and weak radiating capacity due to small scale.Therefore,studying incentive mechanisms to promote cooperation among members becomes an important theoretical and practical issue for farmer cooperatives to play a greater role in consolidating and expanding the achievements of poverty alleviation and promoting comprehensive rural revitalization.Economists employ interdisciplinary research and analytical methods to delve into the maintenance and causes of collective behavior in cooperatives.Within the framework of evolutionary game theory,mechanisms that promote group cooperation have been examined in detail.However,existing studies often assume continuous player participation and disallow exit,which is too idealized and not practical.Researchers further find that a “voluntary participation” mechanism,allowing players to exit,can effectively alleviate social dilemmas.However,its drawback is its impracticality for closely connected individuals.To overcome this limitation,this thesis introduces a novel voluntary participation mechanism–the exit mechanism.It is found that under certain parameter conditions,the exit mechanism can effectively promote cooperation,addressing the challenges of antisocial behavior.The exit mechanism allows players to choose not to participate in interactions,preventing opponents from gaining any benefits(individual active exit from the game)or by paying a certain cost to exclude opponents from the group,depriving them of any benefits(individual passive exit from the game).The thesis constructs “exit strategy” and “social exclusion strategy” to describe these two exit methods and accordingly designs an evolutionary game model to delve into the impact of exit mechanisms on the evolution of group cooperation,exploring in-depth from four main aspects:Ⅰ.In a structured population,the impact of homogeneous passive exit mechanisms on cooperation evolution is discussed.Based on the assumption that all players have the right of social exclusion,a spatial public goods game model with homogeneous social exclusion capacity is constructed.Through simulation experiments,it is found that prosocial exclusion promotes cooperation,while antisocial exclusion disrupts network reciprocity,thereby inhibiting cooperation.However,when both types of social exclusion strategies coexist in the model,antisocial exclusion does not eliminate the promotion effect of prosocial exclusion.In this case,prosocial exclusion can maintain cooperation by opening up more complex pathways that include multiple strategies.Ⅱ.In a structured population,the impact of heterogeneous passive exit mechanisms on cooperation evolution is explored.Based on the assumption that only some individuals have the right to socially exclude,a public goods game model with heterogeneous social exclusion capacity is constructed.Through simulation experiments,it is found that leaders with social exclusion rights can significantly promote the emergence of cooperation,and as the proportion of players with social exclusion capacity increases,the promotion effect becomes more significant.This effect persists even in situations of extremely high dilemma intensity.However,when the network structure becomes assortative or disassortative,the promotion effect still exists but is weakened.Ⅲ.In multiple groups with competitive relationships,the impact of passive exit mechanisms on the evolution of group cooperation is discussed.In multiple groups with competitive relationships,a public goods game model with social exclusion capacity is constructed,and multi-agent simulation experiments are conducted using “intra-group individual competition” and “inter-group collective competition” methods to deeply explore the effectiveness of pro-social exclusion in promoting cooperation.The study finds that pro-social exclusion effectively promotes cooperation,and its promotion effect significantly strengthens with the increase of group competition rate or exclusion intensity.Antisocial exclusion inhibits the development of cooperation,but when both types of exclusion coexist in the model,antisocial exclusion,while hindering pro-social exclusion,does not completely eliminate its effectiveness in promoting cooperation.Antisocial collective exclusion to some extent weakens the effectiveness of pro-social exclusion in promoting cooperation,especially when the group size increases,it may directly eliminate its effect.Ⅳ.In a structured population,the impact of heterogeneous active exit mechanisms on the evolution of group cooperation is investigated.The study sets that only some individuals in the group have the right to exit,and constructs a prisoner’s dilemma game model with heterogeneous active exit capabilities.Through multi-agent simulation experiments in scale-free networks,it is found that in strong social dilemmas,the exit right of leaders can promote the formation of stable clusters of cooperation; however,in weak social dilemmas,the exit right of leaders suppresses cooperation.Meanwhile,network heterogeneity enhances the promotion effect of leaders’ exit rights on cooperation.Based on these theoretical research results,suggestions are finally proposed to promote cooperation among members of cooperatives,including strengthening the implementation of regulatory systems,incentivizing leadership roles,paying attention to external market competition,and managing differentiated exits.In conclusion,this paper is dedicated to deeply understanding the evolution of group cooperation behavior under exit mechanisms.The research findings are of great significance for expanding theoretical research on exit mechanisms in evolutionary game theory and providing a solid theoretical foundation for future research and social governance.