| People’s living standards have been steadily improved with the advancement of science and technology and the development of society.In addition to the satisfaction of substantial life,people also pay more attention to the enrichment of spiritual life,and favor tourism products.Meanwhile,in order to meet the growing tourism demand of mankind,the environmental crises caused by the over exploitation of tourism resources by tourism enterprises,such as the resource shortage and the ecological deterioration,are becoming serious.To realize the sustainable development of economy and environment,respond to the sustainable regulations of the government and meet the green tourism needs of tourists,tourism enterprises have abandoned the traditional tourism operation mode and turned to the green tourism operation mode.This dissertation introduces the idea of green supply chain management into the development research of tourism management,analyzes the correlation among the operation strategies of tourism enterprises,the cooperation mechanism among enterprises,the greenness level of tourism products and the performance of tourism enterprises,constructs the dynamic game models among scenic spots and travel agencies from the perspectives of competitive environment,tourist experience,performance tradeoff and network optimization,derives the equilibrium green technology investment,advertising,technology subsidy and pricing strategies of tourism enterprises in different scenarios through the optimal control theory,and designs the cooperation mechanism among tourism enterprises,to scientifically and reasonably realize the green optimization of tourism enterprises.The main research contents of this dissertation are as follows:(1)This chapter studies the development of green tourism products of the scenic spot and competing travel agencies under the green tourism preference of tourists.Considering the tourist demand affected by the greenness level of tourism products and the competition intensity of travel agencies,this chapter establishes the Stackelberg differential game models among the green scenic spot and travel agencies and the Nash differential game model between the competing travel agencies.On this basis,this chapter explores and analyzes the optimal equilibrium green technology investment and technology subsidy strategies of the green scenic spot and competing travel agencies under three different scenarios: non-cooperation,unilateral cooperation and bilateral cooperation,and discusses the effects of key parameters such as competition intensity of travel agencies and green tourism preference of tourists on the green tourism supply chain performance and green tourism product development through numerical study.The results show that the increase of green tourism preference of tourists encourages the green technology investment of the scenic spot and travel agencies,and improves the greenness level of tourism products,tourist demand and the profits of tourism supply chain.Furthermore,the fierce competition between the travel agencies stimulates the green technology activities of travel agencies and improves the greenness level of tourism products,but it does not always bring higher benefits to travel agencies.The results also indicate that the profits of the scenic spot and travel agencies under the unilateral cooperation scenario are higher than those under the non cooperation scenario,while the greenness level of tourism products and the profits of tourism supply chain under the bilateral cooperation scenario are the largest of the three scenarios.(2)This chapter investigates the competition and cooperation among members of green tourism supply chain network.Considering the green tourism supply chain network composed of competing green scenic spots and competing travel agencies,in which the tourist demand changes dynamically with the greenness level of tourism products,retail price and the competition intensity of tourism enterprises,this chapter establishes the Stackelberg differential game model among the competing scenic spots and travel agencies,the Nash differential game model between the competing scenic spots and the Nash differential game model between the competing travel agencies.Furthermore,considering the competition or cooperation at vertical and horizontal level among the supply chain network members,this chapter derives the optimal equilibrium green technology investment,wholesale price and retail price strategies of the supply chain network members under the scenarios of total competition,horizontal competition,vertical competition and total integration,and analyzes and compares the optimal equilibrium decisions and performances of green tourism supply chain network in the different competition and cooperation strategies of supply chain members.The results show that the cooperation among members of green tourism supply chain network is not always conducive to the profit improvement of green tourism supply chain network.(3)This chapter explores the dynamic decisions of green tourism supply chain considering the tourism experience of tourists.Considering the green tourism supply chain composed of one scenic spot and one travel agency,in which the tourist demand is affected by the greenness level of tourism products,goodwill level,retail price and the green tourism experience of tourists,this chapter establishes Stackelberg differential game models between the green scenic spot and travel agency under the scenarios of centralized,decentralized and revenue sharing.In addition,this chapter derives and analyzes the optimal equilibrium green technology investment,advertising and pricing strategies of green tourism supply chain members in different scenarios,and explores the impacts of the green tourism experience concern level of tourists and the share ratio of the travel agency on the equilibrium decisions of tourism supply chain members.The results show that the higher green tourism experience concern level of tourist effectively stimulates the green technology activities of the scenic spot and travel agency,and brings higher green tourism products to tourists.On the contrary,a lower green tourism experience concern level of tourist encourages the advertising activities of the travel agency and brings higher benefits to tourism enterprises.In addition,the profits of the travel agency and tourism supply chain increase with the increase of the sharing ratio of the travel agency,while the profits of the scenic spot first increase and then decrease with the increase of the sharing ratio of the travel agency.Moreover,although the revenue sharing between the scenic spot and travel agency can bring higher profit to the scenic spot,it can not bring higher profits to the travel agency and the whole green tourism supply chain.(4)This chapter discusses the dynamic decisions of green tourism supply chain under the trade-off between economic performance and green performance.Considering the greenness level of tourism product which affected by the green technology investment of the green scenic spot,the tourists demand,the goodwill level of tourism product and the retail price,and the tourists demand which affected by the greenness level and goodwill level of tourism product,and the retail price,this chapter characterizes the closed-loop correlation between the greenness level of tourism products and the demand of tourists.Based on the optimal control theory,this chapter establishes Stackelberg differential game models between the green scenic spot and the travel agency in the centralized,decentralized and cost sharing scenarios,compares and analyzes the optimal equilibrium solution of tourism supply chain in the different scenarios,and explores the impacts of key parameters such as the tourism environment carrying capacity and the brand awareness of tourists on the equilibrium strategy,green performance and economic performance of tourism supply chain.The results show that the higher brand awareness of tourists can not alleviate the contradiction between green performance and economic performance of tourism enterprises,but make it more prominent.Meanwhile,the higher green tourism preference of tourists realize the relative unity of green performance and economic performance of tourism enterprises.The results also indicate that the lower tourism environment carrying capacity of the scenic spot is not only hindered to the improvement of its green performance,but also caused potential hazards to economic performance.The research results of this dissertation not only improve the relevant theories of tourism supply chain,but also provide a theoretical basis for the development of green tourism supply chain.Moreover,this dissertation provides management enlightenment for tourism operators and managers to realize the green management of tourism supply chain. |
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