| The global container trade market is oversupplied and the liner transportation competition is becoming increasingly fierce.Liner companies sell shipping slots through the offline sales channel,which has some disadvantages,such as oversales of shipping slots,low digitalization degree,and opaque information between shippers and liner companies,which influence the development of liner companies.With the development of "Internet + shipping",liner companies sell capacity through the online sales channel,which guarantees capacity and tracks cargo flow.It has potential advantages and has been widely concerned by the shipping industry,the industry keeps trying various online sales channels.However,there are still some problems,such as immature value-added services,weak canvassing ability,and operating cost of the online sales channel.Therefore,considering the advantages and disadvantages,it is of great significance to study the optimization of online and offline sales channel selection for liner companies to improve their profitability and attract shippers.To improve the revenue of liner companies,firstly,whether liner companies should introduce an online sales channel is solved.Secondly,the channel selection of liner companies is studied according to the different stages of the development of online sales channel.The main research work is as follows:First,the equilibrium states of online and offline slot sales channels are studied,considering the difference of decision-making processe of online and offline channels caused by the overselling behavior and compensation mechanism in the offline sales channel,and the optimal sales channel of liner companies is studied from the macro level.Based on the dynamic game theory of complete information,a two-stage contract mechanism model is constructed considering the ordering proportion coefficient and shipping demand seasonality.The optimal shipper’s ordering volume and the freight rate in the contract market are obtained.Furthermore,the advantages of them are explored from both the liner company and shipper.In addition,the effects of ordering proportion coefficient,overselling compensation cost per unit,the sensitivity of freight rate in the spot market to shipper’s shipping demand,and the demand gap between the high-and low-seasons on win-win sales channel are discussed through sensitivity analysis.The effectiveness of the conclusion is verified by the numerical example.It has provided theoretical support for verifying the effectiveness of the online sales channel,and promoted liner companies to achieve transformation and upgrading under the background of shipping e-commerce.Second,the channel selection model of shipping slots is constructed considering the online channel that the liner company cooperated with a third-party shipping e-commerce platform.Considering the differences in slot pricing and service between the online sales channel by cooperating with third-party shipping e-commerce platform and the offline sales channel by employing the freight forward,the channel selection of the liner company is studied from the micro-level.Based on the complete information dynamic game theory,the multi-agent service quality and pricing model of liner slots sales is established considering the differentiated transportation demand.The optimal service quality and price are obtained.The effects of the cost coefficient of service quality and the commission rate of freight forward on equilibrium solution,the shipper’s demand,and the liner companies’ revenue under different channels are discussed through sensitivity analysis.Furthermore,the optimal sales channel decision of the liner company is decided,and the numerical example is designed to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion.It has verified the effect of different channels on improving the revenue and provided theoretical support for the innovative sales channel of cooperation between liner companies and third-party shipping e-commerce platforms.Thirdly,the channel selection model of shipping slots is constructed considering the self-operating online platform of the liner company.Considering the differences in slots overselling and channel competition between the self-operating online and offline sales channels and the offline sales channel signed with the none vessel operating common carrier,the sales channel selection of the liner company is studied from the micro perspective.Considering the competition between online and offline channels,differential shipper transportation demand functions are described.Considering the interaction among the overselling behavior,fluctuating demand of the shipper,and limited capacity of the liner company,the contract mechanism design model between the liner company and the none vessel operating common carrier is constructed based on principal-agent theory.The optimal contract mechanism under the equilibrium state is explored,and the optimal sales channel of the liner company is proposed,and the refined measures for the liner company to develop shipping e-commerce are formulated.In addition,the effects of the capacity of the liner company and the unit operating cost of the none vessel operating common carrier on the contract mechanism and the liner company’s revenue are explored through sensitivity analysis.The numerical example is designed to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion.It has provided a theoretical basis for liner companies to break the bottleneck of offline sales channels and develop versified sales channels. |
PDF Full Text Request