An Opposite Expectation:Interference Of The U.S. On Laos’ Political Development Process(1954-1964)

In this thesis,main research is done on the interference that the U.S implemented on the political development of Laos from 1954 to 1964 out of its cold war strategy on Southeast Asia.Changes and adjustments of America’s strategies on Laos during the presidency of Eisenhower,John F.Kennedy and Lyndon B.Johnson are elaborated,and the causality between America’s interference and the national political unrest in Laos during this period is discussed.From America’s strategy on third world countries during the Cold War,the root of the gap between America’s "ideal objectives" and the reality in the process of "shaping" Laos’ political structure is explored.This thesis takes reference from original records in National Archives and Records Administration(College Park,MD),Library of Congress,J.F.Kennedy Presidential Library and Georgetown University Library,Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC,as well as other published literature and publications in order to restore the historical facts based on comprehensive primary archives.There are five chapters in this thesis.Chapter One mainly explained the origin of America’s interference on the politics of Laos.In the early years of the Cold War,the U.S.regarded Southeast Asia as "the frontier of containing the expansion of communism”.It attempted to foster an anti-communist regime in Southeast Asia and incorporate this region into the“Free World”international system dominated by itself.The U.S.was dissatisfied with the arrangements in the Geneva Agreements on 1954 that Laos should remain neutral and not join any military group,and it was concerned by the political military organization(Pathet Lao)led by the Lao communist party.Therefore,the U.S.started to press the Royal Lao government,demanding it to take strong measures in retrieving the base controlled by Pathet Lao.It stopped the Laos government from making“major concessions”to Pathet Lao in the negotiation,and by providing financial and technical support,it helped Laos strengthen the“counter-subversion”power.Also,in the 1955 election,the U.S.offered support to the conservatives in Laos.Chapter Two discusses the countermeasures that the U.S.took when the domestic and foreign policy changed in Laos after Prince Souvanna Phouma came into power.Adhering to the neutral position,Prince Souvanna Phouma promoted the reconciliation with Pathet Lao internally and admitted members of Pathet Lao into the coalition government.Externally,he pursued a peaceful and neutral policy and worked to improve the relationship between Laos and other socialist countries.The U.S.was afraid that Phouma’s policy might bring more space for political activities and finally lead to a "complete victory of the communist party in Laos",hence,it took more direct means and interfered in the domestic affairs of Laos,trying to reverse the“compromising”and“pro-communist”route of the Phouma government.When the Lao conservatives that the U.S.supported suffered a huge setback in the 1958 election,CIA began to foster young politicians "with firm anti-communist spirit".These young politicians in Laos took antagonistic actions and destroyed the stability of the Phouma government,which directly led to its collapse.Chapter Three mainly discussed the political unrest in Laos from 1958 to 1961 and the remedial measures of the U.S.A series of "reforms" that Phoui Sananikone,a pro-American politician,earried out after coming into power as the prime minister failed to make any remarkable results.Instead,they exacerbated the conflict among the conservatives and broke the peace agreement between the Royal Lao government and Pathet Lao,which resulted in another political unrest.Facing the political crisis of the Sananikone government,administrative agencies in the U.S failed to come up with a unified solution and had to sit by and watch the government collapse.After the Kong Le Coup in August,1960,Phouma returned as the prime minister and the Lao neutralists finally forged a united front with Pathet Lao.After the unsuccessful plot of the cooperation between the right and the neutralist,the U.S.chose to acknowledge the“legitimate status”of the government built by the right wing group of Laos and provided support to the right wing group to“squash the rebellion,by military means.However,even with support from the U.S.,the right wing government still faced a sea of troubles.Politically,it can not win acknowledgement from the international community,and militarily,it did not have the strength to defeat Pathet Lao and Kong Le.This forced the U.S new Kennedy government to search for a "new method" of solving the Laos problems.Chapter Four elaborated efforts that the U.S.made after Laos Crisis in order to rebuild“Laos’ Neutralization”mechanism and the coalition government.After Kennedy came into power,he had no choice but to adjust the strategy in the face of Laos’ isolation in the international community and the low combat effectiveness of its right wing government.Kennedy no longer blindly seek to establish a "pro-western government" in Laos.Instead,he tried to build an international mechanism that can maintain the "Laos’ Neutralization" as well as a coalition government which included powers from the left wing,the right wing and the neutralist so as to stabilize the situation.In the negotiation of building the "Laos’ Neutralization" and the coalition government,the U.S.encountered with multiple obstructions,including the seeming harmony among allied countries,diplomatic and military pressure from China,Vietnam and the Soviet Union,and Phoumfs stubborn uncooperative attitude.Kennedy had to make concessions again and again and finally "reluctantly accepted"an unsatisfying neutral agreement and a highly unstable "coalition government"framework.Chapter Five explained the "remedial action" that the U.S.took during the failure of the“Laos’ Neutralization" mechanism and the collapse of the coalition government,as well as the transformation of its way of handling the Laos affairs from "political interference" to "military interference".After the international agreement of solving the Laos problems was reached,the U.S.regarded Phouma as the one to be counted on to safeguard the West’s interest in Laos,therefore,it offered financial and political support to Phouma.Being roped in by the U.S.,Phouma’s political stand began to"turn right".He turned into the representative of pro-western powers and the neutralists he led was gradually ripped apart.Under the interference of the U.S.and other interested countries,the "Laos’ Neutralization" principle and the coalition government established on the Geneva Conference in 1962 collapsed soon,and wars once again broke out in Laos.Since there is no longer a political situation to come to another political agreement and the Vietnam War began,the U.S.started to implement military interference on Laos.In conclusion,this thesis concludes the motives and features of America’s interference on the political development of Laos by reviewing historical truth,also,through comparative study on America’s interference on third world countries during the Cold War,the reason why its interference on Laos fails is summarized.In the early years of the Cold War,America’s foreign policy was excessively obsessed with the need of the Cold War.It considered ideology as the essential standard to tell friends from enemies,which resulted in a rigid method of handling the Laos affairs.America’s method was separated from Laos’ national conditions,and this kind of blind interference finally led to a "lose-lose" of the U.S.and Laos.