Research On Arms Control In Outer Space: Cross-domain Deterrence And Strategic Stabilit

As geopolitical competition continues to extend into space,the international community faces the pressing issue of space weaponization.In an epoch characterized by intensified geopolitical jockeying amongst major powers,the specter of space warfare looms menacingly at a hair-trigger juncture.Paradoxically,the multilateral architectures aimed at orchestrating arms control negotiations pertaining to outer space have remained intractably mired in stasis and stalemate.A retrospective examination of history reinforces the notion that arms control ought to have been a domain emblematic of détente and consensus-building among great powers.This raises an inescapable question: what factors have contributed to the enduring and antagonistic divergence in the stances of major spacefaring military powers regarding arms control in space?Undoubtedly,the prevailing political deadlock in current international space arms control negotiations is a result of a multitude of complex factors.Nevertheless,apart from external reasons such as legal mechanisms,technical elements,and political considerations,existing research has overlooked the balancing role that space arms control regime can play,as well as the interconnections among space capabilities,deterrence effects,and strategic stability on a broader level.This study breaks away from the prevailing misconception of isolating space security as an independent research field,and instead returns to the interdisciplinary examination of emerging technologies and traditional nuclear arms control domains.By incorporating the crossdomain deterrence effects driven by major powers’ space capabilities and the strategic stability relations among them,this research provides a fresh perspective on the essence of space arms control.This study introduces a new theoretical hypothesis-the Strategic Adaptation Theory.In general,space arms control serves as a means to balance deterrence effects and strategic stability.The positions and related initiatives of major space-faring military powers on space arms control at the international level will adaptively change in response to shifts in deterrence effects and strategic stability.To be more specific,when a country achieves a breakthrough in certain space technologies at a particular time,its capabilities can be converted into a deterrence effect,forming an advantage in initiating action,and subsequently having a positive impact on strategic stability in favor of that country.In order to consolidate this advantage,the country may adjust its stance on space arms control by reinforcing its position or maintaining the status quo.when an opponent gains an advantage in space capabilities and transforms it into a deterrence effect,a passive disadvantage arises for the former,leading to a potential imbalance in strategic stability that is unfavorable.To counteract this disadvantage,the country may make compensatory adjustments to its space arms control stance.This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the core theoretical hypothesis based on two main threads: the horizontal logical association level and the vertical time dimension level.Firstly,the horizontal analysis follows a cognitive-comparativereasoning-application logic circle by interpreting the different understandings of deterrence concepts and strategic stability relationships among the United States,Russia,and China;elaborating on the cross-domain deterrence effects of space capabilities;analyzing the impact of space capabilities on the strategic stability relationship among major powers;and assessing the overall space strength of major space-faring powers,ultimately leading to China’s space arms control proposal design and explaining the interconnectedness between space arms control,cross-domain deterrence,and strategic stability.Secondly,through a longitudinal analysis that follows a chronological order,this study comparatively analyzes and summarizes the evolution of space capabilities,changes in strategic stability relations,and shifts in space arms control stances of the United States,Russia,and China over the past sixty years.By constructing historical timelines and comparing the overlaps between the evolution of each party’s outer space deterrence capabilities and changes in their space arms control stances,the study validates the core hypothesis that posits the existence of an adaptive relationship between space capabilities and space arms control stances.This study concludes that the difficulty in reaching a consensus on space arms control positions among various parties is due to the fact that,when formulating these positions,countries primarily consider the fluctuations in space deterrence capabilities among major adversaries and the resulting impact on strategic stability relations,rather than solely pursuing the idealistic goals of achieving outer space peace and space threat management.For major space-faring nations,reaching a mutually compromising or conceding space arms control agreement is not the ultimate objective of their participation in negotiations.Conversely,within the bargaining process,proposing space arms control plans and continuously adjusting one’s stance is,in itself,an effective balancing means of maintaining and consolidating national space security and core interests.The varying progress of different countries in space capabilities determines their distinct strategic priorities in the realm of space arms control negotiation,and as a result,their differences in position will not automatically converge.If the core hypothesis of this study holds true,it can be predicted that despite the current stalemate in international space arms control negotiations,this situation is destined to persist and become increasingly intricate as countries continue to upgrade their space capabilities,leading to potential imbalances in strategic stability.For any country,proposing new space arms control initiatives solely from the existing perspective will inevitably face greater challenges.Therefore,after providing a new analytical perspective and reasonable explanation for the formation of the space arms control dilemma,this paper concludes by combining theory and practice,offering practical suggestions for China to maximize the use of space arms control strategy to maintain national space security and core interests,in hopes of finding effective solutions to the space arms control challenges faced by China in the international community.