Research On The Impact Of Mixed Ownership Reform On Investment And Financing Performanc

In recent years,State-owned enterprise classification reform has gradually formed a consensus in the academic community,but there is no consensus on how to design the reform path according to different types of state-owned enterprises.Classified governance of state-owned enterprises has become an important problem to be solved in the current theoretical research and reform practice.In this paper,we sysmetically study the mixed ownership reform of state-owned sectors under a unified government investment management framework From the perspective of the government investment and the improvement of the government investment and financing performance,the commercial state-owned enterprises are brought into the state-owned assets management system and the public-interest state-owned enterprises are brought into the public sector management system.Considering the difference of function orientation between the two types of state-owned enterprises,this paper proposes the corresponding performance evaluation for different types of state-owned enterprises,which enables us to evaluate the effects of the reform of mixed ownership objectively.This paper deepens the theory of classified reform of state-owned enterprises,which helps to promote the consensus of the mixed ownership reform and reduce the resistance of reform.thus providing a reference for further research.Combined with the practice of China’s economic system reform,this paper discusses the reform of mixed ownership of commercial state-owned enterprises and public welfare state-owned enterprises.The key idea of mixed ownership reform is to full making use of the comparative advantages of different governance subjects,and help them increase their productivity.The concrete measures are to implement the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in the management of enterprises(hereinafter referred to as the reform of state-owned enterprises)and to promote the public-private partnership(PPP)in public administration.The aim of the reform is to overcome the absence of the government by improving the property right system.The key to implementation lies in the following aspects: establishing a modern property rights system providing a clear ownership and responsibility with a transparent corporate governance structure;preventing the “predatory hand of goverments”,making different capital ownership sectors are on the same track of legal systems.The function of public economy and non-public economy can be effectively brought into play by mixing with each other on the basis of equality.That is to say,it can help enterprises break through the restriction of administrative intervention,stimulate market vitality and improve the efficiency and ability of public service with the advantage of non-public capital inherent in system and mechanism.At the same time,with the help of social credit advantage of public capital,non-public capital can eliminate hidden barriers,widen development space and enhance comprehensive ability.The second chapter reviews the reform literature of state-owned enterprises.The reform of state-owned enterprises is divided into mixed ownership reform of commercial state-owned enterprises and public welfare state-owned enterprises.In the past research,the most of papers are empirical studies,and theoretical studies are rare.The empirical research shows that the relationship between the proportion of stateowned shares and corporate performance has not achieved the same results.Most of the current studies focus on the privatization of state-owned enterprises,and the research on the implementation of mixed ownership reform in state-owned enterprises is relatively incomplete.As a reform of mixed ownership of public welfare state-owned enterprises,the theoretical research of PPP model is mainly focused on the characteristics of contract,but due to the lack of data and reasonable performance evaluation indicators,The empirical study on the impact of PPP model on China’s economic growth remains to be an open question.PPP model could attracts private sectors investment on the public infrastructure construction and it also change the traditions that the local infrastructure construction mainly depends on financing platform.This study therefore fill in the blank on the alternative relationship between PPP model and financing platform in the literature.The third chapter constructs the mixed ownership reform model and answers:what is the key to the realization of the mixed ownership reform? What is the significance of the reform of mixed ownership to the improvement of enterprise performance?The fourth chapter discusses the influence of mixed ownership reform on the performance of commercial state-owned enterprises,and discusses whether the reform of mixed ownership is helpful to improve the TFP of state-owned enterprises and alleviate the debt problem of state-owned enterprises by using the method of tendency score matching double.To improve overall corporate performance?The fifth chapter discusses the influence of mixed ownership reform(PPP)on the performance of public welfare state-owned enterprises.First of all,we build a financing platform model to analyze its operating mechanism,and provide answers to the causes of public service problems: public service inefficiency,lack of social security,imbalance of demand structure,etc,and what are the basic explanation of these problems behind? Then the empirical method is used to analyze whether the reform of mixed ownership of public welfare state-owned enterprises(PPP)is more efficient than that of public welfare state-owned enterprises(local financing platform).The sixth chapter studies the reasons why the reform of mixed ownership of public welfare state-owned enterprises(PPP)is blocked.And our empirical studies try to investigate the substitution relationship between PPP and financing platform.The main conclusions in this paper are summarized as follows:(1)The economic model of mixed ownership shows that the reform of mixed ownership benefits the enterprise performance and promotes of investment efficiency.When considering the production efficiency and loan constraints,the state-owned ratio and performance of the enterprise have the characteristics of state dependence,that is,the privatization effect is first best when the production efficiency is low,and the partial privatization effect is first best when the production efficiency is in the middle.When production efficiency is high,nationalization has the best effect.(2)The reform of state-owned enterprises can improve the performance of enterprises.After further considering the influence of marketization,industry competition and regional characteristics,it is found that the effect of reform is heterogeneous.When the degree of market is high,the effect of reform to improve productivity is useful;when the degree of market is low,the effect of reform to reduce debt is more appreciated,and the reform effect of industry with low degree of competition fits better than that of industry with high degree of competition.The reform of state-owned enterprises in the eastern region has the best effect,the reform in the central region has a better effect on reducing debt,and the privatization in the western region has significantly increased productivity.(3)Based on the construction of financing platform and PPP database,the relationship between financing platform and PPP model and economic growth is empirically analyzed.The empirical study shows that the financing platform hinders the improvement of local per capita GDP,and the PPP model is beneficial to the promotion of local per capita GDP;The financing platform model not only increases the local government revenue,but also increases the local debt risk,while the PPP model increases the government revenue and lowers the local debt risk.(4)Although the performance of PPP model is better than that of financing platform,the promotion of PPP model is not smoothing.The existence of financing platform hinders the local government’s demand for PPP projects,and it also hurts the transformation and development of government investment and financing.The innovations in this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:(1)Under a unified government investment management framework,commercial stateowned enterprises are included in state-owned asset management,and public welfare state-owned enterprises are included in public product management,which is conducive to strengthening the understanding of government investment management.Promote the coordinated advancement of the reform of the two types of state-owned enterprises.(2)Change the previous single performance evaluation model,establish a classified evaluation model,and consider multi-dimensional evaluation indicators.In addition to production efficiency,in view of the current high leverage and debt risk accumulation,the solvency indicator has been introduced to make performance evaluation more comprehensive and more steady.(3)The model not only considers the influence of financial friction on the overall production efficiency,but also further studies the influence of the formation of cooperative teams between heterogeneous producers on the performance of enterprises.(4)Using enterprise panel data from the existing Chinese industrial enterprise database,using propensity score matching double difference method,empirically analyze the impact of state-owned enterprise reform on enterprise performance,which can effectively reduce the estimation bias caused by endogenous problems;On this basis,further consider the impact of different marketization levels,competition levels,and different reform methods in the eastern,central and western regions on corporate performance to improve the reliability and accuracy of model estimates.(5)Build a framework for urban construction investment and financing models based on literature,and then build models to analyze the operating mechanism of local financing platforms.(6)Construct a database of financing platform and PPP,analyze the alternative relationship between PPP model and financing platform,and analyze the relationship between financing platform and PPP financing model and economic growth for the first time.This paper confirms that the mixed ownership reform in commercial state-owned enterprises enhances the vitality of state-owned economy,maintains and increases the value of state-owned assets,and enlarges the function of state-owned capital.While the PPP Model in public interest state-owned enterprises helps to enhance the government’s ability that better protects people’s livelihood and serves the society and provide public goods and services more effectively.