| Since the reform and opening-up,China has achieved rapid economic growth,but the development cost caused by regional imbalance and disharmony has always existed and tends to expand(Sheng et al.,2018;Tang,2019).The above problems are inevitably related to market segmentation and local protection.Under the fiscal decentralization system,local governments and officials intervene in resource outflow by administrative means around GDP and fiscal and tax competition,thus forming a situation of inter regional market segmentation(Yin and Cai,2001;Qian et al.,2012;Liu and Kong,2021),which has become an important reason for the obstruction of cross regional allocation of resources(Fang,2009;Song and Huang,2014).Although the market segmentation between regions in China has eased with the reform and opening-up(Lu and Chen,2006),the local protection formed under various local policies still exists,and the problem of market segmentation has not been completely solved(Liu and Kong,2021).At present,many major changes have taken place in the conditions and environment of China’s economic development.The problems faced by local governments are no longer limited to a single administrative region,and more and more economic affairs are external or overall(Tang,2019).Therefore,the construction of national market integration and regional economic linkage development are particularly important.The Chinese government has done a lot of work on the construction of the national unified market.The opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on establishing a more effective new mechanism for regional coordinated development issued in November 2018 clearly put forward that "Based on giving full play to the comparative advantages of various regions and narrowing the regional development gap...Deepen reform and opening up,resolutely break down inter regional interest barriers and policy barriers,accelerate the formation of a new mechanism for regional coordinated development that is beneficial to overall planning,orderly competition,green coordination and win-win sharing,and promote regional coordinated development." It can be seen that accelerating the construction of a national unified market,promoting cross regional investment of micro enterprises,and realizing cross regional free flow and market-oriented allocation of resources are of fundamental and strategic importance for promoting coordinated economic development and double cycle construction.Enterprise cross regional investment is a process in which enterprises independently allocate capital,labor,scientific and technological resources and intangible assets across regions throughout the country.It is an important way to realize cross regional allocation of resources and an important means to break market segmentation.To some extent,a unified "cross regional company" is an important symbol of whether market integration is really realized(Liu and Kong,2021).Therefore,how to promote cross regional investment and development of enterprises is of great significance to build and improve the national unified market and coordinate the balanced development of regional economy.The existing literature on the cross regional flow of resources mostly focuses on the macro or meso level(dunning,1998;Busse and hefeker,2007;Qian and Cao,2017;Wang and Xu,2017),while at the micro level,scholars discuss the influencing factors of enterprise cross regional investment from the aspects of property right nature,political connection,market segmentation,social trust and social network(Fang,2008;Pan and Yu,2011;Xia et al.,2011;Cao et al.,2015,2019;Cao and Jia,2020).This paper holds that,in addition to geographical factors,the institutional factors behind China’s regional environmental differences play an important role.Among many institutional arrangements,the institutional arrangement of central local relations is the most fundamental.It deeply affects the behavioral motivation of central and local governments,as well as the behavioral logic of local government officials and enterprises.Therefore,it is quite necessary to analyze the cross regional development behavior of enterprises from the perspective of the fundamental institutional arrangement of central local relations.The relationship between central and local governments refers to the basic relationship between power and resource allocation vertically in the national system.The governance of central local relations has always been the main line of Chinese government governance.In "on the ten major relations",Mao Zedong specifically discussed the problem of mobilizing the enthusiasm of the central and local governments,and pointed out: "we should expand a little local power on the premise of consolidating the unified leadership of the central government...The relationship between local governments should also be handled well.Our traditional principle is to advocate taking the overall situation into account,mutual assistance and mutual accommodation." It can be seen that the dynamically balanced central local relationship is not only an important cornerstone to achieve national peace and public security,but also the key to correctly deal with the relationship between local governments,government and market,government and enterprises.At present,the academic research perspectives on the relationship between central and local governments mainly include but are not limited to sociology,politics,law,finance and Economics(Rong et al.,1998;Zhang,2009;Lv,2014,2019;Fan,2014;Zhou,2017;Zhou,2007;Xu,2009).In view of the relevance of disciplines and research contents,this paper focuses on summarizing the central local relationship and its specific performance from the perspective of economics and finance,and intends to investigate the impact of cross regional allocation of resources from three aspects of finance,personnel and specific policies.In view of the relevance of disciplines and research contents,this paper focuses on summarizing the central-local relationship and its specific performance from the perspective of economics and finance,and intends to investigate the impact of central-local "finance","officials" and "affairs"(Policy)on Enterprise cross regional investment.In view of above,taking the central-local centralization and decentralization theory,fiscal decentralization theory and political tournament theory,enterprise resource-based theory as analytical tools,combined with the analytical framework of macroeconomic policy and micro enterprise behavior,this paper studies the impact of central-local fiscal relations,central-local policy relations and central-local official relations on enterprises’ cross regional investment.Specifically,the fourth chapter takes the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance as the foothold to observe the central local fiscal relationship,and takes the A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as a sample to test the impact of the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance on the cross regional investment of enterprises,and test the specific mechanism of the above impact;On this basis,the heterogeneity is analyzed from the perspectives of local government intervention motivation,intervention conditions and intervention ability;In the expansion research,it specifically tests the impact of enterprise cross regional investment on innovation and the regulatory role of central local fiscal relationship(vertical fiscal imbalance)in the above impact.The fifth chapter takes the heterogeneous industrial policy as the foothold to observe the relationship between central and local policies,and takes A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2007 to 2015 as a sample to test the impact of central specific industrial policies,local specific industrial policies and central and local common industrial policies on cross regional investment of enterprises;On this basis,the heterogeneity test is carried out from the perspective of specific factors affecting resource allocation,namely,local government motivation,regional resource endowment,the degree of resource competition,the convenience of market-oriented access to resources and the object of resource allocation.In the expansion research,this chapter further tests the regulatory effect of central local policy relationship(different types of industrial policies)on the innovation effect of enterprise cross regional investment.The sixth chapter takes the exchange of officials in different places as the foothold to observe the central local personnel relations,and takes the A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as a sample to test the impact of the exchange of officials in different places on the cross regional investment of enterprises and its mechanism;On this basis,the heterogeneity is analyzed from the perspectives of official age,tenure,regional preference and regional marketization degree;In the expansion research,on the basis of distinguishing the impact of different types of communication on specific enterprises,this paper specifically tests the regulatory role of central local personnel relations(officials’ Rotation)in the above impact.Based on the above research,the research conclusions of this doctoral thesis are summarized as follows:First,the aggravation of the vertical financial imbalance will significantly inhibit the cross regional investment behavior of SOE,that is,the greater the vertical financial imbalance,the less likely the SOE in the jurisdiction to make cross regional investment and the lower the cross regional investment intensity.The mechanism of the above impact is that the increase of vertical fiscal imbalance will encourage local governments to guide more loan resources to local SOE in order to develop the local economy,thus reducing the cross regional investment of SOE under their jurisdiction.The negative effect of the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance on the cross regional investment of SOE in the jurisdiction mainly exists in the situation that the local government has stronger intervention motivation(greater incentive for leaders’ promotion),better intervention conditions(more resource endowment)and greater intervention ability(lower evaluation of the relationship between the government and the market and higher degree of local protection).Cross regional investment of SOE can promote enterprise innovation,but the intensification of vertical fiscal imbalance will inhibit the positive effect of cross regional investment on innovation.Second,the central specific industrial policy significantly promoted the cross regional investment of enterprises,the local specific industrial policy and the central and local common industrial policy significantly inhibited the cross regional investment of enterprises.The impact of the above three types of industrial policies on enterprises’ cross regional investment is more significant when the local government has stronger motivation,better regional resource endowment and greater resource competition;The role of central specific industrial policies and central and local common industrial policies on cross regional investment of enterprises is more significant when it is less difficult to obtain resources in a market-oriented way,and the role of local specific industrial policies on cross regional investment of enterprises is more significant when it is more difficult to obtain resources in a market-oriented way;The central specific industrial policy significantly promoted the cross regional investment of non-SOEs,the local specific industrial policy significantly inhibited the cross regional investment of SOEs,and the central and local common industrial policy significantly inhibited the cross regional investment of non-SOEs.Cross regional investment can significantly promote enterprise innovation output.The central specific industrial policy does not play a significant regulatory role in the above relationship,the local specific industrial policy has a negative regulatory role,and the central and local common industrial policy has a positive regulatory role in the above relationship.Third,Officials rotation(both central rotation and provincial rotation)can significantly promote the cross regional investment behavior of enterprises in the inflow place.Central rotation officials improve the degree of participation of SOEs in regional integration,alleviate the degree of local protection,and promote the cross regional investment of SOEs;Rotation officials from other provinces have increased the scale of foreign investment and export in the inflow areas,so as to promote the cross regional investment of non-SOEs.The role of central rotation officials in promoting cross regional investment of SOE is only established when the officials are older,the place of birth and office are not in the same province,and the degree of regional marketization is worse,but there is no difference due to the length of office of officials;The role of rotation officials from other provinces in promoting the cross regional investment of non-SOEs is only established when the officials are younger,have a shorter term of office,are not born in the same province and have a better degree of marketization.The rotation of central officials inhibits the positive effect of cross regional investment of SOEs on innovation,while the rotation of provincial officials will further promote the positive effect of cross regional investment of non-SOEs on innovation.Compared with the existing studies,the main contributions of this doctoral thesis are as follows:(1)Based on the investigation of the central government and local governments in the aspects of "people"(official governance),"finance" and "affairs"(policy),this paper combs out the specific embodiment of the central-local relationship in three aspects: the central-local financial relationship reflected by the vertical financial imbalance,the central-local policy relationship embodied in heterogeneous industrial policies and the central-local official relationship embodied in the rotation of officials.Thus provides a new perspective for the study of cross regional investment behavior of enterprises.(2)It provides an analytical framework for how the central local relationship affects enterprises’ cross regional investment,deepens the theoretical understanding of the relationship between the government and the market and the relationship between the government and enterprises,and further enriches the research on the micro enterprise behavior of macroeconomic policies.(3)Obtained a more detailed research conclusion on enterprise cross regional investment behavior,summarized the financial and policy roots affecting enterprise cross regional investment,and found that the central government’s adjustment of local personnel is an effective means to promote enterprise cross regional investment,which forms a useful supplement to the existing research. |
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