Deposit Insurance System,Bank Governance And Risk Taking Efect

Deposit insurance system and bank governance are important topics in the financial field.China has formally implemented the deposit insurance system since 2015.In the process of the development of deposit insurance,great changes have taken place in bank governance.From the perspective of bank governance,combined with the policy practice of deposit insurance system and bank governance and the change of market environment,this dissertation puts forward some problems from several important aspects closely related to bank governance,and uses this as a logical clue to outline and deduce the whole logical framework,and finally puts the foothold on the coordination of deposit insurance system and bank governance.The first question is,since the deposit insurance system can not only maintain financial stability,but also prone to moral hazard,and improving the degree of information disclosure can reduce the moral hazard brought by the deposit insurance system,how can we better alleviate the moral hazard of the deposit insurance system? Based on the data of Chinese commercial banks,this dissertation empirically tests the impact and synergy of deposit insurance system and bank information disclosure on their risk taking.The results show that the improvement of bank information disclosure will reduce bank risk taking,and the implementation of deposit insurance system will help to reduce bank risk taking.The implementation of deposit insurance system and the improvement of bank information disclosure can not only inhibit bank risk taking alone,but also reduce bank risk taking synergistically.The lower the bank’s franchise value,the lower the capital ratio and the smaller the asset scale,the higher the bank’s risk bearing,and the stronger the synergy between the deposit insurance system and the bank’s information disclosure on its risk bearing.Based on this,this dissertation believes that we should give full play to the financial stability effect of deposit insurance system,maximize the synergy between deposit insurance system and market constraints,and design differentiated deposit insurance system measures considering heterogeneity and bank information disclosure requirements.The second question is,since most studies believe that there is a nonlinear U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance limit and bank risk taking,and the bank government background will also affect the optimal deposit insurance limit,how should the bank government background be considered in minimizing the bank risk taking caused by the deposit insurance system? This dissertation brings the bank government background into the analysis framework of the impact of deposit insurance limit on bank risk-taking,and makes an empirical test with the data of Chinese commercial banks.The results show that there is a U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance limit and bank risk taking,and deposit insurance limit can minimize bank risk taking.Deposit insurance limit and bank government background not only have their own impact on bank risk taking,but also weaken the restrictive role of market mechanism,and then weaken the U-shaped relationship between bank risk-taking and deposit insurance limit.The higher the resident savings rate,the smaller the net interest margin,and the higher the bank risk taking.The more obvious the impact of the bank government background on weakening the U-shaped relationship between the deposit insurance limit and the bank risk taking.Based on this,this dissertation believes that in the initial stage of China’s deposit insurance system,we should give full play to the role of deposit insurance limit and bank government background,and effectively manage bank risk taking.The third question is,since the deposit insurance system not only stabilizes the banking system,but also produces moral hazard problems,and bank capital supervision,as an important part of bank financial supervision,will alleviate the negative effects brought by the deposit insurance system,how should bank capital supervision deal with the moral hazard brought by the deposit insurance system? Based on the data of Chinese commercial banks,this dissertation empirically tests the impact and synergy of bank capital supervision on risk taking behavior.The results show that capital supervision will reduce bank risk taking,and it plays a greater role in reducing bank risk taking in the crisis period than in the normal period.After the introduction of deposit insurance system,capital supervision and deposit insurance system will interact to further reduce bank risk taking.The smaller the asset scale,the higher the financial leverage,the worse the institutional environment,the higher the bank’s risk taking,and the stronger the synergy of deposit insurance system and capital supervision on its risk taking.Based on this,this dissertation believes that we should strive to improve bank supervision,give play to the synergy of capital supervision and deposit insurance,and jointly manage bank risk taking behavior.The main innovations of this dissertation are as follows Firstly,from the perspective of bank information disclosure,this dissertation discusses the synergy between deposit insurance system and bank information disclosure on bank risk taking.Different from the existing literature,the deposit insurance system is incorporated into the analysis framework of the impact of bank information disclosure on its risk taking,and the state-owned banks are selected as the control group.When discussing the synergistic effect of deposit insurance system and bank information disclosure on its risk taking,the impact of bank franchise value,capital ratio,asset scale and other variables on its risk taking is also considered,It is found that the deposit insurance system and bank information disclosure can act synergistically on bank risk taking,which can significantly reduce bank risk taking,especially for banks with lower franchise value,lower capital ratio and smaller asset scale.Secondly,the perspective of bank government background,this dissertation discusses the synergy of deposit insurance limit and bank government background on bank risk taking.Different from the existing literature,after comprehensively considering the economic cycle and the evolution of the deposit insurance system,the deposit insurance limit reflecting the local economic development level is set,and the relationship between China’s deposit insurance limit and the bank government background is discussed,especially when discussing the synergy between the deposit insurance limit and the bank government background on its risk bearing,the resident savings rate The study found that the bank government background will weaken the U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance limit and bank risk taking,especially in areas with higher resident savings rate and banks with smaller net profit margin.Thirdly,from the perspective of bank capital supervision,this dissertation discusses the synergy of deposit insurance system and bank capital supervision on bank risk taking.Different from the existing literature,in addition to the state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks,the state-owned banks are selected as the control group of the financial crisis,and the state-owned banks are selected as the control group of the deposit insurance system.Therefore,after distinguishing the impact of bank capital supervision on bank risk taking in the crisis period and normal period,the impact of deposit insurance system and bank capital supervision on bank risk taking is discussed,It is found that deposit insurance system and capital supervision can reduce bank risk taking synergistically,and it is more obvious for banks with smaller asset scale,higher financial leverage and worse institutional environment.