| Over the past 45 years since reform and opening-up,China has always adhered to the basic national policy of opening up.In keeping with the process of economic globalization,China has made remarkable progress and created new opportunities and vitality for the world with its development.But at the same time,with the profound and complex changes in the domestic and international environment,China’s globalization process is facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges.On the one hand,China’s economy has entered a critical period of transformation from a stage of high-speed growth to a stage of high-quality development,which requires a strong domestic economic circulation system and a solid economic base to support its development.On the other hand,anti-globalization trends such as the China-Us trade and technology war and the repatriation of manufacturing from developed countries have increased the uncertainty and volatility of the international trade environment.The traditional international cycle path of ‘both ends outside’ is no longer sustainable.To solve this problem,General Secretary Xi Jinping put forward a clear proposal to build a new development pattern in which the domestic cycle is the main body,and the domestic and international cycles are mutually reinforcing in the report of the Party’s 20 th Congress.Under the background of new era,as the main force of implementing the national major development strategy,state-owned enterprises need to re-examine that how to make full use of the linkage effect of domestic market and international market to build a new development pattern of double circulation.And as an important contributor and driver of the state-owned enterprises’ transnational network system,overseas subsidiaries are an important strategic fulcrum for Chinese state-owned enterprises.But the promotion of the strategic position of overseas subsidiaries in the transnational relationship network and the expansion of autonomous power,as well as the disadvantages of state-owned enterprises’ own public ownership,may induce the opportunistic behavior within state-owned multinational corporations under the condition of incomplete contract.Therefore,from the perspective of incomplete contract,it is particularly necessary to study the governance of trade contract between the state-owned enterprise and its overseas subsidiaries.First of all,this paper takes the incompleteness of contracts between state-owned enterprises and overseas subsidiaries as the main line,rationalizes the basic thoughts and analytical logic of transaction cost theory,property right theory and relational contract theory which is related to incomplete contracts.And we comprehensively examine the governance structure of incomplete contracts between the state-owned enterprise and its overseas subsidiaries from three stages of contract conclusion,contract renegotiation and contract performance.Secondly,this paper summarizes the market failure theory and the political attribute theory which are related to the function of the state-owned enterprise and clarifies the political value and economic value of the state ownership.And based on the characteristics of trade between the parent company and its subsidiary company in transnational relationship network,this paper draws on the theoretical tools and research methods of eclectic theory of international production,new-new trade theory and institutional change theory.Lastly,this paper puts forward the general theoretical framework of the state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary corporation,which combines the theory of state ownership,incomplete contract and private multinational parent-subsidiary corporation.Based on the above analysis,this paper walks on the road of ‘taking questions – analysis-solving problem’ to carry out a specific analysis.The main research contents are as follows.Firstly,this paper summarizes the development process and formation mode of China’s state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies.And then this paper reveals the characteristics of contractual relationship and governance problems between the state-owned enterprise and its overseas subsidiaries.This is the ask questions section of this paper.Secondly,based on the perspective of transaction governance structure,this paper analyzes the contracting motivation of the state-owned enterprise and its overseas subsidiaries.We compare the institutional arrangements in the search of contracting objects and the selection of contracting methods,and determine the contract governance structure matching the nature of the trade between state-owned enterprises and overseas subsidiaries.Based on the perspective of residual rights allocation,this paper analyzes the necessity of reasonable allocation of residual rights between the state-owned enterprise and its overseas subsidiaries through contract renegotiation,and revises and optimizes the selection of control structure and the distribution of cooperation interests which are not involved in the contracting stage.Based on the perspective of performance governance,this paper reveals the adverse impact of institutional path dependence on performance efficiency in transnational trade between state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies.And then the interactive relationship and applicable conditions of formal contract and relational contract in performance governance are analyzed and compared.And we also discuss the institutional arrangement and optimization direction of compulsory performance mechanism and selfperformance mechanism.The above is part of the analysis.Lastly,this paper puts forward more targeted and operable policy suggestions from three aspects,which are clarifying the functional positioning of the government,establishing the comprehensive governance system of stateowned multinational parent-subsidiary companies,and improving the relevant institutional arrangements of the governance structure.This is the part of solving problem.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows.Firstly,with the promotion of the strategic position of overseas subsidiaries,the resource allocation of state-owned multinational parentsubsidiary companies have gradually shifted to the transnational trade between enterprises based on the differences in competitive advantages.The search of contracting objects and the selection of contracting methods need to resort to different governance structures to ensure the trade efficiency.Secondly,the incompleteness of the initial contract makes state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies face the risk of cooperation residual being occupied.It is necessary to renegotiate the ownership of the right of control and the distribution of cooperation interests which are not involved in the contract afterwards.In the choice of control structure mode,the trade contract environment and enterprise factor intensity directly affect the disturbance effect of residual power on the actual bargaining position,and finally affect the bargaining results between state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies.For the distribution of cooperation benefits,the change of national system distance and the difference of enterprise ability level leads to the difference of initial negotiation ability,which further affects the decision-making sequence and structure of the distribution of cooperation interests.Thirdly,low efficiency path dependence and free-riding behavior in transnational trade have not been fully expressed in the contract renegotiation stage.Formal contract governance and relational contract governance should be properly introduced in the process of performance according to the verifiability and discount rate of transnational trade contracts,which can prevent the possible loss of compliance efficiency.The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following four aspects.Firstly,this paper innovatively integrates the theory of state-owned enterprises and the theory of private multinational parent-subsidiary companies,which can revise the premise of private enterprise adopted by neoclassical economics with state ownership and make a profound investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of state ownership faced by state-owned multinational parentsubsidiary companies,as well as the problems of contract governance caused by this.And then this paper factors such as the supply of international public goods,the change of international investment environment,the development of national strategic objectives and the influence of international reputation are taken into account in the governance structure design of the conclusion,renegotiation and implementation of the trade contract of multinational parentsubsidiary companies.Therefore,this paper sets up a key analysis framework for the research and development of state-owned multinational companies.Secondly,this paper uses the analytical logic and theoretical tools of heterogeneous enterprise trade to discuss the international production cooperation and profit distribution process between state-owned enterprises and overseas subsidiaries.By using this method,this paper highlights the important strategic fulcrum role of overseas subsidiaries in the participation of state-owned enterprises in the international and domestic dual cycle,which is more in line with the characteristics of the new development pattern.With the continuous expansion of business and market fields,the gradually accumulated competitive advantages of overseas subsidiaries make themself to occupy a higher strategic position and more autonomous space in the dual-cycle development of state-owned enterprises.Therefore,the contractual relationship between enterprises has changed from the traditional bureaucratic contract to the trade contract based on international division of labor and cooperation.So this paper establishes a trade model of state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies based on international division of production and enterprise heterogeneity,introduces trade attributes such as factor intensity,contract environment quality and enterprise capability level,and examines the impact of changes in trade attributes on the choice of contract governance structure of state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies.Therefore,the study expands and enriches the mainstream views and analytical paradigms.Thirdly,from the perspective of incomplete contract,this paper comprehensively uses transaction cost theory,property right theory and relational contract theory to comprehensively,and systematically investigate the incompleteness and governance of trade contracts in the process of conclusion,renegotiation and performance of cross-border trade contracts.By comparing the transaction costs and contract benefits of governance structures under different trade situations,this paper puts forward the selection criteria of the governance structure of trade contract in different stages,summarizes the applicable conditions and scopes of different governance structures,and realizes the research breakthrough in this field.Fourthly,this paper innovates the research method of governance structure of state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies,and closely combines theoretical model analysis with numerical simulation and case test,which lays a rigorous theoretical and logical foundation for the study of the governance structure of state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies.Most of the previous literature used econometric models to demonstrate the factors affecting the transnational trade and governance structure of state-owned multinational parent-subsidiary companies.Such research methods lacking rigorous theoretical logic support may limit the accuracy of the selection of governance structure of stateowned multinational parent-subsidiary companies.Therefore,this paper absorbs the analytical logic and theoretical tools of state-owned enterprise related theory,transnational trade theory and incomplete contract theory,and establishes and optimizes the mathematical theoretical model for the research on the contractual governance structure of state-owned multinational parentsubsidiary companies.On this basis,the numerical simulation method is used to verify the main conclusions derived from the theoretical model,and the analysis results are supported by practical cases,which greatly improves the depth and accuracy of the research. |
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