Research On Corporate Social Responsibility Behavior Strategy And Government Regulation Of Two-Sided Platforms

The Internet platform economy,fueled by cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence,cloud computing,blockchain,and big data,has rapidly gained ground and become a crucial driver of economic and social activity.Platform enterprises,which form a crucial component of this emerging economic model,have a vital role to play in promoting economic and social activity.However,as they grow and expand,platform enterprises face a dual challenge: to fulfill their social responsibility and to avoid behaviors that run counter to it,such as monopolistic practices,discriminatory pricing,and privacy violations.To succeed in the long term,platform enterprises must embrace corporate social responsibility(CSR)and actively engage with society.By doing so,they can enhance their brand value,build trust with customers,increase market share,and gain a competitive edge.At the same time,they must be aware of the risks and drawbacks associated with the platform economy,such as market dominance and data misuse,and take steps to address them.To achieve these goals,platform enterprises need to adopt a balanced approach that combines development and norms.CSR is a key strategy for the sustainable development of platform enterprises,and government regulation plays an essential role in preventing alienation and unfair competition behaviors.Therefore,building on a review of relevant domestic and international literature,this thesis explores the implementation and alienation regulation of CSR behavior in two-sided platform enterprises,focusing on the fulfillment and alienation of platform CSR behavior as well as the characterization of alienation as big data discriminatory pricing behavior and exclusive transaction behavior.Drawing on theories and methods from two-sided market theory,CSR theory,consumer utility theory,game theory,inductive reasoning,mathematical derivation,and numerical simulation,this thesis examines the implementation decision and alienation regulation of CSR behavior from the perspective of both platform enterprise development and government regulation.Ultimately,this research aims to promote the normative,healthy,and sustainable development of the platform economy.The main research contents of this thesis are as follows:(1)Based on the existing research,taking the monopoly two-sided platform as the research object,this thesis considers three kinds of performance of CSR on the platform:unilateral user benefit,bilateral user benefit and bilateral user do not benefit,as well as different levels of user information: some users have responsive expectations,while others have negative expectations.The thesis constructs respectively equilibrium models of CSR and pricing decision of monopoly platform under six conditions of complete information(incomplete information)and CSR without affecting demand(affecting unilateral demand and bilateral demand).Then,the study analyzes the equilibrium user scale,pricing level,CSR level,platform profit,user surplus,and social welfare,discusses the impact of platform CSR behaviors,information levels and network externalities on platform decision-making,and obtains relevant research results and management implications.(2)In reality,it involves the competition between two or more platforms,expanding the study from a single monopoly platform to two competing platforms.The thesis considers the horizontal differences(spatial positioning)and vertical differences(CSR)of the two competing platforms,as well as the uniform distribution of perceived value among bilateral users with respect to platform positioning and performance.The thesis constructs respectively competitive equilibrium models for CSR decisionmaking and pricing for two platforms under three situations: neither platform performs CSR,both platforms perform CSR,and only one platform performs CSR.Then,the study analyzes the equilibrium user scale,pricing level,CSR level,platform profit,user surplus,and social welfare,discusses the impact of platform CSR behaviors on the competitive equilibrium and social welfare of two platforms,and obtains relevant research results and management implications.(3)Through investigation analysis and literature review,the thesis explores the alienation behavior of CSR,embodied as big data discriminatory pricing behavior and exclusive transaction behavior.For the problem of big data discriminatory pricing behavior by platform enterprises,the thesis constructs an evolutionary game model of pricing behavior for two asymmetric competitive two-sided platforms under government supervision.The model takes into account the asymmetry between platforms in terms of market share,capital and technical capability,and considers the concealment of big data discrimination and the professionalism of third-party supervision agencies.The thesis uses System Dynamics to discuss the pricing strategy selection of the two competitive platforms and analyzes the regulatory dilemma of repeated big data discriminatory pricing behavior by the platforms.Additionally,the thesis introduces a third-party supervision agency to construct an evolutionary game model of big data discriminatory pricing behavior for two-sided platforms under the collaborative supervision of the government and the third party.Combining with System Dynamics,the thesis analyzes the influencing factors of the big platform and the third party’s strategy selection,improves the regulatory mechanism design of big data discriminatory pricing behavior,and obtains relevant research results and management implications.(4)To address the issue of exclusive transaction behavior by platform enterprises,this thesis considers the difference in market power and decision-making power between two asymmetric competitive platforms.The asymmetry(market power)between the two platforms is described by the difference in cross-network externality intensity between bilateral users.The thesis constructs Stackelberg competitive equilibrium models for the exclusive transaction behavior of two-sided platforms under three situations: neither platform implements exclusive transaction behavior,the big platform implements exclusive transaction behavior,and the small platform implements exclusive transaction behavior.Then,the thesis conducts a comparative analysis of the profits,user surplus,and social welfare of the two platforms before and after the implementation of exclusive transaction and explores the impact of exclusive transaction on competition.Based on this,the thesis models and analyzes the effects and rationality of government penalty,government subsidy,and government tax regulation from three perspectives of platform profit,user surplus,and social welfare,and obtains relevant research results and management implications.The main innovations of this thesis are as follows: Firstly,the consideration of CSR performance behavior on two-sided platforms,including the impact of CSR on bilateral users’ choice of platform.CSR is embedded into the user value utility function as a factor affecting bilateral users’ platform choice,and a CSR and pricing decision-making model is constructed in two-sided markets.Secondly,the alienation behavior of CSR on two-sided platforms is considered,specifically big data discriminatory pricing behavior and exclusive transaction behavior.A regulation mechanism for this behavior is designed under the competition of two asymmetric platforms.These contents expand the theory of CSR,enrich the theory of two-sided markets,deepen the theory of government regulation,and provide a theoretical basis for two-sided platforms to actively fulfill CSR,improve their competitive advantage,enhance the effectiveness of government regulation,and promote the normative,healthy,and sustainable development of the platform economy.