| Macro leverage ratio(real economy debt/GDP),as a key indicator linking debt scale and economic growth,plays an important role in studying and judging financial risks and formulating financial macro-control policies.After the international financial crisis in 2008,China’s macro leverage ratio continued to rise,and gradually became the focus of the theoretical circle and decision-makers.However,the existing literature mainly focuses on the mechanism and mode of monetary policy and macro Prudential policy affecting the macro leverage ratio,and pays less attention to the role of bank supervision.The real economic debt is mainly composed of bank credit,and bank supervision can regulate the total amount and structure of bank credit,thus affecting economic growth.Therefore,it plays an important role in regulating the macro leverage ratio.At present,China’s economy has changed from a high-speed growth stage to a high-quality development stage,and the debt level and structure of the real economy have also undergone profound changes.We should overcome inertia thinking and analyze the changes of macro leverage ratio and countermeasures from different policy perspectives.This paper starts from the perspective of bank supervision,focusing on the main line of "the impact of bank supervision on macro leverage",and conducts research from the theoretical mechanism,empirical analysis,policy practice and other aspects,with a view to providing policy suggestions for bank supervision departments to regulate macro leverage.First,this paper combs the theoretical mechanism of the impact of banking supervision on macro leverage.Based on financial deepening theory,financial instability hypothesis,debt deflation theory and balance sheet recession theory,the regulation of bank credit by bank supervision will affect economic growth,and then affect the macro leverage ratio from both horizontal and structural aspects.On the level,changes in the total amount of credit will affect economic growth and financial risks.Therefore,there are three ways for bank supervision to affect the level of macro leverage:first,to promote economic growth by increasing credit supply;second,to suppress debt growth by reducing the size of shadow banks;third,to prevent financial risks by improving credit quality and promoting the steady operation of banks.In terms of structure,bank supervision can reduce the degree of credit mismatch between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,and alleviate the imbalance of macro leverage structure.The credit mismatch originates from the differences in financing premium,survival rate and production efficiency between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.Therefore,there are three paths for bank supervision to affect the macro leverage ratio structure:first,improve the financing premium structure of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises by promoting the development of Inclusive Finance and restricting banks from financing local government debt;Second,improve the survival rate of small and medium-sized private enterprises through the implementation of liquidity support policies;Third,improve the production efficiency of enterprises by deepening the application of financial science and technology.Second,this paper analyzes the level evolution and structure of China’s macro leverage ratio.In terms of level,the differential equation is derived and the nonlinear least square method is used to fit the data,and the evolution path of the macro leverage ratio is obtained.It is found that the macro leverage ratio in China presents an evolution process of accelerating first,then slowing down and converging to a stable upper limit.Comparing the actual value of the macro leverage ratio with the value of the evolution path,we can divide the changes of the macro leverage ratio since 2011 into stable growth stage(2011-2013),"leveraging" stage(2014-2017),"deleveraging" stage(2018-2019)and fluctuation stage(after 2020).In terms of structure,on the basis of the general framework of the leverage ratio of residents,non-financial enterprises and the government discussed in the existing literature,the paper analyzes the performance and problems of the imbalance of macro leverage ratio,expands the concept of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,and points out that the root of the imbalance of macro leverage ratio structure lies in the credit mismatch between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.Then,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of banking supervision on the level of macro leverage.The impact path of bank supervision is classified into two types of supervision measures,namely "stable growth" and "risk prevention".The principal component analysis method is used to measure the intensity of bank supervision.It is found that the changes in the intensity of bank supervision since 2011 can be divided into "weak supervision" stage,"strong supervision" stage and "neutral supervision" stage.Then,the tvp-sv-var model was used to test the relationship between the intensity of bank supervision and the change of macro leverage ratio.It was found that increasing the intensity of "stable growth" and "risk prevention" both had the effect of reducing the growth of macro leverage ratio and stabilizing the level of macro leverage ratio,and this effect was variable from time to time:the role of the two types of policies in the"weak supervision" period before 2017 was relatively limited,and the role of the"strong supervision" period from 2017 to 2019 was significantly strengthened,After 2020,the role of"neutral regulation" has declined.At the same time,the empirical findings show that the expansionary monetary policy and fiscal policy will raise the level of macro leverage,which also highlights the importance of strengthening banking supervision to "stabilize leverage".Last,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of banking supervision on macro leverage structure.The DSGE model with the characteristics of credit mismatch is constructed to prove that the credit mismatch leads to the imbalance of China’s macro leverage structure,which is manifested in the larger decline of total output caused by adverse productivity impacts such as trade friction and COVID-19,and the smaller increase of total output caused by the macro policy of "stable growth".Then the bank supervision is incorporated into the DSGE model to simulate the role of three types of bank supervision policies.The research finds that:first,banking supervision can improve the financing premium structure and reduce the output decline of the economy in the face of adverse external shocks by promoting the accelerated development of Inclusive Finance and restricting banks from financing local government debt;Second,bank supervision can improve the survival rate of small and medium-sized private enterprises and enhance the effectiveness of the "stable growth" policy through the implementation of liquidity support policies;Third,banking supervision can improve the productivity of two types of enterprises by deepening the application of financial technology,and the increase of total output caused by the increase of total output of private enterprises is more significant.According to the above research conclusions,this paper puts forward suggestions for the banking regulatory authorities to better regulate the macro leverage ratio from the perspective of banking supervision,including:first,promote "stable leverage" through "stable growth",increase the financing supply of infrastructure construction,stabilize the reasonable financing of real estate enterprises,and enhance the risk resistance ability of local small and medium-sized banks;Second,promote "excellent structure" through "error correction and matching",vigorously promote the application of financial technology,promote the incremental efficiency of inclusive financial services,and promote the risk mitigation of local government debt;The third is to promote "strong supervision" through "digitization",establish a supervision concept suitable for digital supervision,strengthen the data support of supervision,and improve the digital supervision tools. |
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