A Priori Under The Background Of Naturalistic Epistemology

The "a priori" is traditionally regarded as a type of knowledge, and sometimes as a type of truth. In this essay I shall follow the practice of recent discussants who discuss whether there is a piriori under the background of naturalistic epistemology. The first part of this essay has explained the related background presumedly.Naturalistic epistemology arose in 1970s in American, which can be regarded as a decisive turn of naturalism existing in epistemology. But epistemology has recently witnessed a number of efforts to rehabilitate rationalism, to defend the existence and importance of a priori knowledge o(?) warrant, such as BonJour and Casullo. As the "a priori" supporters, they make great efforts to prove the existence of a priori, and this effort has sometimes been coupled with an attack on naturalistic epistemology. So following the first part, I briefly introduce what a priori is, and then also introduce the conception of naturalistic epistemology.Inside the naturalistic epistemology, which is in full flourish, also contains divergence or controversy about a priori. The focus on the controversy is that whether the "a priori" is compatible with a naturalistic epistemology. The "a priori" opponents of naturalistic epistemology think that the possibility of a priori knowledge is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology, and the epistemology treats human knowledge as entirely explicable as a natural phenomenon in the physical world. Quine is best known for advocating this view. He point out that epistemology is a branch of science. Devitt takes in Quine's doctrine, and believes that there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that is the basis of science. So they both reject a priori knowledge. In Part Three, the view and point of Quine and Devitt are illuminated.The "a priori" modifiers present a conception of naturalistic epistemology that is entirely compatible with a priori justification or knowledge. Rey, Goldman and Kitcher are the leading exponents. They insist that whether or not there is a priori knowledge is an empirical issue. They try to show that the definition of the a priori can be clarified, and that the concept of a priori knowledge can be embedded in a naturalistic epistemology. Part Four takes up most spaces of writing. The purpose of the "a priori" modifiers is to give us a better appreciation of the respective merits of a priori and the empirical, as well as a better understanding of how epistemological naturalism comports with a priori.According to such divergence, in the last part (epilogue), this essay tries to compare the "a priori" opponents of naturalized epistemology with the "a priori" modifiers and then analyze basic differences between them and their correlation. It's clear that from the controversy between the opponents and the modifiers, it will gives important clue to us for thinking the future of epistemology.