Research On Global Carbon Emissions Cooperation Mechanism Based On Game Theory

At present, the global climate negotiations have differences in region difference, benefits orientation, and timing of emissions reductions and other aspects. And a number of important interest groups evolved in the emissions game, and multiple checks and balances derived from the highly competitive game situation. The European Union is an active promoter of global climate change negotiations; but the US leading "umbrella group of countries" swing the attitude; "Group of 77 + China" leading developing countries not assume responsibility for emissions reductions. Co-reduction mechanism of the formation depends directly on the balanced result of developed countries - developing countries "two camps". In the international Carbon reduction mechanisms game, two camps in order to maximize their own interests, trapped in a "prisoner's dilemma" non-cooperative game, and can not reach a cooperative agreement. Between the developed and developing countries, this may produce carbon emission reduction as key research content, and by game analysis the evolution of multiple carbon emission reduction mechanism. Infinitely repeated games proposed to solve the international climate, and the formation of Pareto optimal international carbon emission reduction mechanism of thought. International Game also described patterns of carbon emissions under the North-South cooperation mechanisms for the formation of the reality of the path to emissions reduction that would be the world's major interest groups united in a common framework of safeguarding the global environment. Finally, try to design feasible from a practical level, through institutional arrangements, building an inclusive environment for low-carbon model of the market, and to promote community building, to the transformation of other low-carbon economic development model for China to achieve a viable path to find the carbon emissions and promote low carbon economic development.