Under The Condition Of Complete Information Asymmetry Settlement Auditing Quality Research

The development of market competition inevitably brings increase of the uncertain factors in settlement of completed audit of a project, and the quality assurance of completed audit settlement becomes more and more difficult. At the point of information economics, asymmetries of information places a premium on the behavior of opportunism, namely, opposite selection and moral hazard are the main causes of completion of the audit market clearing disorder and irregular behavior of market participants, which finally lead to the break faith in the construction audit market. So it's feasible and very important to introduce the asymmetries theory of information into the field of completion of the audit settlement.A brief overview of this thesis is shown as follows:The asymmetries theory of information and the completion of the audit settlement, including the content, form and characteristic of asymmetries theory of information. All the analysis is based on the model of information completion of the audit settlement and focus on completion of clearing the construction units and audit unit audit conducted a detailed conspiracy economic analysis.Under the condition of complete information asymmetry settlement auditing body behavior game analysis. It founds the behavior game model between investment unit and audit unit,construction unit and audit unit.And it founds the behavior game model among principal parts of completion of the audit based on two-person game , and explores their game relationship.It analysis complete settlement auditing quality in the condition of information asymmetry. The relationship between complete information asymmetry settlement auditing and control model, audit pay incentive was studied and the corresponding model was established. Besides, how to ensure the quality of completion settlement auditing was analyzed at the position of the construction unit and the audit unit.