The Logic About Evolution Of Institution | | Posted on:2006-09-29 | Degree:Master | Type:Thesis | | Country:China | Candidate:C B Pan | Full Text:PDF | | GTID:2155360182966407 | Subject:Jurisprudence | | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | | With the analyses tools of sociobiology and from the perspective of survival strategy of selfish genes and selfish individuals in the evolution, this paper mainly discusses the evolution process of two sorts of institution. One is the spontaneous cooperation institution, another is the cooperation institution under authority. This paper also briefly analyzes the evolution process of state which is the uppermost institution of the cooperation institution under authority, and points out that in a group controlled by the cooperation institution under authority, evolution will eventually produce a special structure and procedure which can control the behaviors of the managers strictly and ensure the interests of the managers and the interests of the group remained very closely aligned. It is the direction of the evolution.How the cooperation to be maintained and evolved between selfish individuals? And how the cooperation to be expanded continually? This two questions are the key of the evolution of institution.The survivals of the genes are ruthlessly selfish. How the altruism of the existence machines of selfish genes— organism individuals—can be evolved by natural selection? A rising subject—sociobiology— 's central task is to answer this question. They have mainly provided three theories (inclusive fitness, reciprocity altruism and ESS) to explain such phenomena in the 1960s to the 1970s.The inclusive fitness points out that the altruism between the memberships of kin can improve individual' s fitness in the evolution, because they share some proportional of common gene. Both sides can often benefit from reciprocity cooperation, therefore it need no more explain why reciprocity altruism can improve individuals' fitness. But a problem is raised: How to prevent the inbreak of the cheats and the defectors?Evolution will eventually produce steady rules that deal with conflicts of interest between individuals. This is the contributions of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). ESS is the strategy taken by the most individuals of a group, and in the same time it can' t be intruded by any other strategies for ESS have the highest fitness in that special conditions. ESS make us know that Evolution will eventually produce steadyrules that deal with conflicts of interest between individuals and the rules are self-enforced.Tit for tat (TFT) strategy can be used to explain why cooperation can be self-enforced without authority in small group. Axerold' s strategy tournament show the strong power of TFT strategy, and when face with TFT, cooperation is the best choice for anyone. TFT strategy is the only power to prevent inbreak of the cheats and the defectors in the conditions without authority.But the two conditions for the applying of TFT strategy are repeated game and identifying the counter players. This determines the cooperation group must be enough small, because once the group becomes big, the number of repeated game between individuals will decrease, and increase the difficulty to identify the counter players. So the spontaneous cooperation based on TFT strategy must be exist in a small group. How the cooperation between human beings can transcend the small groups such as family, gens and village? The evolution produce other kind of institution which runs under authority and ensure cooperation between human beings transcend the scope of a small group.The basic dilemma of the cooperation institution under authority is the disaccord between the interests of managers lived in a competitive condition and the interests of the group. This disaccord lead to those managers who try their best to boost cooperation between the group will be eliminated unexpectedly by natural selection. So the cooperation under the authority will collapse if this basic dilemma still not be overcome.In the endless process of the evolution, group usually will evolve a special structure and procedure to conquer this basic dilemma. This special structure and procedure is a control system which ensure the accord between the interest of managers and the interests of the group, and managers can pursue their interests only through to improve the interests of the group. This law can apply to not only the cells but also the human being society.State which helps cooperation between human beings transcend the scope of a small group also faces with the basic dilemma. In order to conquer this basic dilemma,state goes through the process of the evolution from the approach of philosopher to the approach of democracy and constitutionalism. In this process, technology and institution relates each other and grows cumulatively, which can't be changed by human beings' will and ration. | | Keywords/Search Tags: | Sociobiology, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy(ESS), Tit for Tat(TFT), Institution Evolution | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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