Interest-relative Invariantism:a Challenge To Attributor Contextualism

Contextualism is the thesis that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions (e.g. x knows that p) depend upon the attributors' contexts in which they are uttered. This thesis has been challenged by Interest-Relative Invariantism which claims that knowledge ascriptions are not context-sensitive, and the truth values of them are partly determine by the putative subjects' practical interests rather than the attributors' contexts. I will outline the most important problems that contextulists face in this case: whether the knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive and how to explain its counter-intuitive cases. I will suggest new ways to illustrate the context-sensitivity of the knowledge ascriptions, and point out that Invariantists criticizes contextualists'explains to their counter-intuitive cases basing on inappropriate comparations. The conclusion is that the challenge from Interest-Relative Invariantism is not vital.