Research Of The Stakeholder Co-Governance Mechanism

After the agreement on property right system reform that focused on the multi-element property right reform , the keystone construction of enterprise institutions for state-owned enterprises has switched to innovation of the corporation governance. This is a national and international problem because it encompases the solution for the agency problem after ownership and the decision rights have been seperated. Generally, efficient corporate governance depends on the symmetry arrangement of the residual claim rights. These residual claim rights conform to the negotiation balance among correlating stakeholder groups in an enterprise that is in essence a contract aggregation. However, the "Capital Hires Labour" model has been considered as the most efficient method of corporate governance according to main economics. The Theory of Venture Prefrence Difference, the Theory of Supervision Technology Difference, the Theory of Imperfect Contraction as well as the explanation of Negotiation Ability Diversity all concentrate on explainig why the model of "Capital Hires Labour" is the most efficient one. As the main theories are derived from the new classic economics , they commonly have limits on the analysis method. So far as the experience of many countries are concerned, where corporate goverrnance matches to the model that main economics insists on , their competition capacity declined for the enterprises' unilateral governance. This made economists thinking about reform change to considering enterprises' stakeholders rights , especially for companies in the U.S.A. Moreover, large-scale purchasing and annexing causes a lot of social problems. And in the "OECD Corporate Governance", stakeholder's rights have been emphasised.Through the contrast of the English-American and the German-Japanese models, despite their difference from the macroscopical system environment and microcosmic financing structure , both of the governance models tend to be more and more similar.To protect the stakeholders rights in many companies so that their long-term value or persistent development can be realized, the re-construction of the corporate governance becomes more and more popular. In this way the reform of Chinese SOEs' Corporation Governance then also depends on our system environment and the financing structure.Owner absence and insider controling are the radical factors that make SOEs run inefficiently. They are the consequences of the arrangement of communion property rights. The stakeholder co-governance mechanism is a practical and feasible model to rebuild the structure of an SOEs corporation gorvernance from each aspect .The structural innovation of SOEs must , therefore , organically combine co-governance and contingent governance. The former means of cooperation among stakeholders and the latter means different outsider governance structure. This paper provides a design for cooperation of the inside governance and the contingent outside governance mechanisms after giving some fundamental principles . The innovation of this paper majorly lies in the re-construction of both the tiptop power framework and the directorate according to the different negotiation capacity of the stakeholder groups.To build a stakeholders convention not only guarantees the long-term co-operation among different stakeholders , but also supplies a legal procedure to set up the bank director institution and the employee director institution. Besides, it isn't necessary to construct a parallel supervise convention to protect the un-dominated stakeholders' rights. Through the re-construction of the tiptop power convention and the directorate, these groups' rights have properly at an equilibrium. So for those enterprises whose directorate has been perfected, the cancelling of the supervision convention is the right way to reduce the cost of transaction and promote governance efficiency.