Theoretic And Empirical Study On Centrality Of Share And Performance Of Chinese Listed Companies

The efficiency of the listed companies, to much extent, depends on the rationality of the share structure. Because the corporate governance of the listed companies is closely bound up with the share structure, which is a kind of variety with the types including completely centralized one of individual shareholders and the decentralized type of masses of stock-holders. The centrality of share will work on the listed companies' structures of management and control and in the end on the efficiency of corporate governance. So the proper degree of the share's decentralization is much importance of the efficiency of corporate governance. However, the improper share structure of the Chinese listed companies has been seriously negative effects on the way to improving the mechanism of corporate governance and facilitate sound development of security market. Optimizing the share structure is in the most urgent situation at present. In a word, it is essential to study the effect of share structure on the efficiency of corporate governance, moreover, to set up the share structure, which is more propitious to the improvement of performance. In this thesis we initially put forward the issue and then analyze the theories of share structure and corporate governance. In this part we discuss the issues as follows, the property right relationship in a corporate is the result of the share held by different kinds of stockholder. As to the various structures of share, the proportion of share is the most important factor of affecting the control rights in the listed companies, and the share structure ties up the ways or mechanism of corporate governance. We expatiate on the effects of insiders control and mechanisms of supervising on corporate governance as well. In the second part we analyze and compare, the main types of share structure, the Anglo-American pattern and German or Japanese pattern and their own traits and the tendency of the establishment of share structure in the future. Then we let the synthetically grading method marry to linear regression in moments of empirical analysis in order to get rid of the limitations of short term phenomenon caused by single ratio to research the efficiency of corporate governance, and we also research the effects of the share centrality on the corporate structure. The outcome of our empirical analysis shows that the proper share centrality vails the efficiency of corporate governance. Onthe basis of the study above we analyze the reasons for the inefficiency of listed companies in our country. We find out that there are two main causes, one is that there are games among the stockholders, and the large share holders have the motivates to monitor the managers on their best behalf, while the small shareholders take free ride due to the high costs of monitoring. The other one is that the extreme centrality or the other extreme of share will hinder the mechanism of monitoring from working effectively and it is easy to form the problem of insiders control. At last we table proposals and measures to improve the corporate governance and optimize the share structure of Chinese listed companies to improve the efficiency of corporate governance.