With the development of economy and the adjustment of industrial structure, more and more land change from farmland to non-farmland. Among all the ways, it is the primary way to expropriate peasant collective-owned land. Since the standard of compensation is made by the government, it can not reflect the scarcity of land. The compensation for expropriated land is too low, and leads to a big gap between the remise price of state-owned land and the expropriation compensation to the peasant Concerned interest groups pursue the land benefit from their self-interest angles. The behavior of concerned interest groups not only hurts the peasant benefits, but also speeds up the farming land transfer to be non-farming land.In undeveloped areas, the peasant is an inferior group. If they lose their land, they will face unemployed risk because of their poor non-farming skills and the infrequent employment chances. So how to distribute the land benefit not only will influence the operating efficiency of land market, but also the stability of one area. This paper bases on the analysis of the land benefit distribution in She county, explaining how local government deals with the contradiction between the development of economy and the indemnity for living standard of peasant whose land has been expropriated. The paper tries to explain why macro policy of central government can not control the speed of non-farming uses of the farming land. On this foundation, it gives some policy suggestion for improving the market operating efficiency. The text includes six chapters.The first chapter: preface. This part primarily includes study scope of this paper; the research findings domestic and abroad that is related to the land expropriation and the structure of this paper.The second chapter: the policy of land expropriation in She county. This part primarily includes the social background of the land expropriation policy creation, and the detailed content of the land expropriation policy in she county.The third chapter: benefit distribution of land expropriation in She county. This part mainly consists of the land resource status of She county, the character of land market, and benefit distribution of land in the process of land expropriation and land remise.The fourth chapter: the reason for the benefit distribution of land expropriation. In this part, I analyze the reason for the benefit distribution of land expropriation in two ways: The first is the collective behavior of the involved interest groups; the second is the economic reason.The fifth chapter: discussion about the rationality of the land benefit distribution. In this part, I want to explain the reasonable standard of expropriation compensation, unreasonableness of land compensation in She county, and the carry-over problem of land expropriation.The sixth chapter: conclusion and suggestion. Based on the above analysis, I get the main conclusions as followed:1. In the market of farmland expropriation and remise, the peasant interest group get 32% land benefits; the county government interest group get 52% land benefits; the upward county government interest group get 15% land benefits. In the market of non-farmland expropriation and remise, thepeasants group get 26% land benefits; the county government interest group get 67%; the upward county government interest group get 7% land benefits.2. The land system has a great impact on the distribution of land benefit.3. That the collective land is confined excessively by the law weakens the estate benefit right of peasant.4. The main body of the Country land property right is not clear, which weakens the negotiation ability of peasants so that the peasant interest group gets less land benefits.5. The fee of using state-owned land do not have the function it should have.The suggestions I give are as follows:1 .Found state-owned estate managing corporation to change the status without a clear line between the functions of the government and enterprises.2. Distinguish severely pr... |