The Allocation On The Property Rights Of The Firm In The Firm's Members

It is actually worrying about enterprise if someone concerns about one's country and one's people", so the importance of the firm should be the first place in market economy. There is no true promotion of firm competitiveness, neither to make the country prosperous, and also can not enrich the people. The efficiency which the firm runs depends on the arrangement of institutional quality that the firm chooses. What this thesis paid close attention to is a basic problem in the system of modern firm theory, namely what is the balanced state of the property right (enterprise ownerships and enterprise power of operation) disposed on enterprise members, That is to say that for who disposes property right of the enterprise and how to dispose is more efficient.This thesis thinks that according to the property right characteristics and behavior characteristics of different factor-owners , enterprises property rights( enterprise ownerships and enterprise power of operation) should be disposed to different factor-owners( including capital owners, producers and managers), and the balanced state of the property right structure of enterprise is formed too. Generally, the producer owns the right of policy-carrying out and gets regular contract remuneration; The capital owner (the stock holder) obtains enterprise ownership in the general meaning (residual claim and control right), besides, the surplus incentive and restriction (negative incentive) should be given to managers and important producers, and the system of how to share residual claim should be set up. The operator still enjoys the authorities of the policy-making power and administrative power in the enterprise. The real entrepreneur must have dual identity of capital owner and operator (the professional manager) at the same time.The best encouragement comes from the external competition of the enterprise and disposition of the property right inside the enterprise. To the latter, this thesis is also probed the contract design in accordance with different incentive of different factor-owners. This kind of contract design that can't be popularized in modern market economy is directed against the main problemsIIexisting in property rights allocation in enterprise. That purpose is to prevent and controls various opportunism behavior at purposes (the opportunism behaviors in a broad senses include lie, shirking the responsibility, loafing on the job, thumbing a lift, harming others to benefit oneself etc), to make participants get more concentric.The economist, Zhou Qiren points out: We have the most expensive enterprise system and cheapest entrepreneur in the world. In the light of the great history and social background around us, This thesis tries to contribute to the theoretical research of the enterprise system and promoting enterprise system reform which heart is the property right.