Research On Information Releasing And Regulation Of The Listed Company Under Asymmetric Information

It has taken Chinese securities market 10 years or so to undergo the course of developing from the early 1990s which lasted for nearly one hundred years in the developed countries. And it also made some dramatic progress in such aspects as market absorption, exchange methods and the supervising regulations. As a matter of fact, there exist great potentialities as for the market with the furthering of reform and the development of China's economy. However, the unceasing growth of the market is in demand of the more standardized operating environment and the more open, fairer, more impartial market order. From 1993 to Oct 2001, Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the Shenzhen Exchange Board (SZEB) and Shanghai Exchange Board (SHEB) had punished 218 cases of infringement of the releasing rules. And what is the most notorious among these cases is the prevailingly false information attached to such fake reports. Since the CSRC carried out such criteria that the Three-year Average Revenue Rate (TARR) of the companies should reach 10% while their fore-coming stocks distributions, which led to a common profit-rigging stage for the company. In recent years, the companies' assets quality, financial status and operating performance are now commonly queried in the light of the "False Account" accidents happened in several companies, which has put stricter requirements on information release and regulation. The serious asymmetry of information in the open market has brought great loss to individual investors, which greatly hindered the development of the market.Therefore, how to hedge the risks of false information under the conditions of asymmetric information has become an imperative research task. Based on economic theories and laws provisions of Information Releasing System (IRS) in securities market, this dissertation introduces the necessity and the abnormality of Information Releasing System (IRS) on the ground of the status quo of the domestic and the overseas researches. By analyzing the asymmetry of market information in the market underwhich it also expounds that there exist the moral risks and the reverse choices of the investors, it explains the certainty of Information Releasing System (IRS) by deducing the asymmetric information model under the reverse choices. Because of the low efficiency in stock market caused by moral risks and reverse choices which is not helpful to make effective distribution and establish social reputation, the article utilizes the game theory and information economics integrating theory and practice to set up the supervision game model and agent's reputation model i.e. multi-stage dynamic principal-agent model and at the same time it also makes use of the theories of expecting utilities to conducting analysis on revenue-cost on the premise of a rational individual. On the whole, the dissertation brings forth science proofs while avoiding companies' information releasing risks on the base of which it also provides the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) with some constructive countermeasures.