The Research Paper On The Measure That Government Appointing CFO To State-owned Enterprise By The Finance Bureau Of Changchun

The goal of the economic system reform of our country is to set up socialist market economy, which core is to set up and perfect modern enterprise system of " property right clear, having well defined power and responsibility, separate government functions from enterprise management, management science ". The socialism of our country has naturally determined the public-owned leading position in national economy of economy. In the course of State-owned Business Enterprise Reform, enterprises break away from government and become the main body of market runs, but have not paid attention to the supervision of state-owned assets. Right expansion of some enterprise leader causes state-owned enterprise " Insider Control ", show as some unit leader interfere accountants' authority in accordance with the law in word, get, instigate, force and distort the accounting data, forge the account book, set up accounts outside the account, shift national assets, evade the tax revenue, even corrupt and bribe, embezzle public funds.In order to solve the state-owned enterprise" Insider Control ", we must strengthen the supervision on the manager of state-owned enterprise, strengthening the control over state-owned assets, the System of Government appointed CFO arises at the historic moment. The article introduces the theory of " Agency cost " and " Separation of Power Check and Balance " in order to make the Policy reasonable theoretically.The article has analyzed the necessity of the Government appoints the CFO Policy from the realistic angle: First of all, it is a need of accountants' management system reform. The article has point out the drawback of current accountants' management system, has proposed the goal mode that " the accountant returns to enterprises, strengthen supervision by investor". Government appointing CFO policy is a concrete form of this kind mode. Secondly, the Policy of Government Appoint CFO is the need to solve state-owned enterprise Insider Control and to prevent state-owned assets from losses. Appoint system can solve state-owned assets lose its position. The CFO is garrisoned in enterprises as representatives of personification of state-owned assets, make the state-owned assets' investor restored to the throne, which can solve insider control effectively. Moreover, it is a need of perfecting company's administration structure that the government appoints a CFO to stated-owned enterprises. The policy makes the balancing relation of investor, administrator and supervisor distinct. It is the perfection of company's administration structure. Finally, the Policy can solve accounting information distorted of state-owned enterprise at present.The section of investigation in article has introduced the background and concrete conditions of Changchun Appointing the CFO firstly, then summarize the result of Appointing CFO, The main characteristic of Changchun city's appointment work is that the CFO is appointed by the Bureau of Finance, its salary and conditions is appropriated by the finance; The CFO has function served to enterprises, urge supervise ability through service. Findings is: (1) Having prevented the emergence of the corruption effectively, the state of state-owned assets losses weakened; (2) Having improved the quality of the accounting information of state- owned enterprise; (3) Having promote the state-owned enterprise to change the operating mechanism, and having improved enterprise's management level; (4) The CFO plays the bridge role. The enterprise is glad to accept to the CFO, resentment and behavior did not take place.We can affirm the feasibility of this system through the investigation and research on the Policy of Government Appointed the CFO to State-owned Enterprise by Changchun. However, the weak point exists either in the work of appointment by the Finance Bureau of Changchun, including the CFO's personal liability for fault is indeterminate; The CFO's specific duty has suspicion of interfering the decision-making power in operation of enterprises; The matching of the...