Collateral Duty In Labor Contract

As China accelerates its economic system reform while foreign-invested firms gaining access, there has been an remarkable upward trend for labor disputes. Moreover, the nature of such disputes has evolved, expanding from cases merely concerning job quits, dismissals, salary and social insurance to those with completely new dimensions, involving non-disclosure, non-compete agreements as well as job handovers. In essence, some of these disputes relate to violations by one party or both parties of collateral duty under their labor contracts. In light of these myriad and highly complex labor disputes, much of the "Labor Law of the People's Republic of China", which entered into force as of Jan.1, 1995, has failed to adapt itself to the fast-changing landscape of labor relations, including the need for a well-defined? collateral duty in labor contracts. This thesis starts with an analysis of the essential concept of collateral duty, and proceeds to the author's own understanding of?that concept?in labor contracts, highlighting some of the ambiguities and shortfalls that are typical in the judicial practice in this regard. The paper also gives a presentation of legal rules concerning collateral duty in labor laws of Taiwan and some foreign countries. It compares this very notion with the one that exists in the "Contract Law of PRC", addressing several categories of typical collateral duty in the field of labor law, that requires urgent elaboration, such as non-disclosure, non-compete obligation, and concludes with recommendations on improving the rules regarding collateral duty in China's labor law.