Takeover,Performance And Corporate Governing

This paper studies on the problem of Takeover of China's security market. TheTakeover market is the last means that solve the problem of Principal-Agent in company.One ripe security market can maximize the Takeover function and weaken theproblem of Principal-Agent because of the separation of ownership and management.Nowadays, the Takeover function of China's security market is unable to be playedeffectively because of the reality of the exchangeable equity and non-circulating equityand the ownership holding non-circulating equity is the largest blockholder in Chineselisting companies. This paper systematically analyzes the function mechanism of Takeover market andthe influence of the corporate governing caused by Takeover behavior. Takeover'scondition of China's security market over the years is researched correspondingly. Atlast, the irrelativity between Takeover behavior and the corporate performance iscertified by the analysis of relativity of the performance index (NROA and POR) of104listing companies and Takeover-proportion of Takeover behavior. Finally, the paper points out that the separation of the equity of China's securitymarket is the basic reason of this kind of the question. So the only way to solve isconverting all equity into Circulation equity. Thus, the scheme of converting all equityis the key and Change non-circulating equity into exchangeable equity is the feasibleapproach to convert all equity into exchangeable equity. Furthermore, before convertingall equity into exchangeable equity, some other measures is needed, for example,relaxing law control about purchase, developing multi-level stock trade market, etc. The paper is divided into six parts. Part I: The review of literature review aboutTakeover theory. Part II: The function mechanism of Takeover market. Part III: Theinfluence of corporate governing caused by Takeover's behavior. Part I: The analysis ofTakeover state of China's security market over the years. Part V: The positive analysis ofTakeover behavior and corporate performance. Part VI: The countermeasure andsuggestion...