Value Analysis On Control Right Transfer Of Listed Companies In China

The market for corporate control has got general attention as a backstop mechanism for disciplining management. However, people now pay more attention to private control benefit in the background of centralized share and expropriation of large shareholder. This paper offers a preview in the first place and brings forward two concept of control in different meaning. And then we make an overview on corporate governance and the market for corporate control in the focus of corporate control. Then we make an economic analysis on resources allocation function of the market for corporate control and introduce the methods for measuring private benefit of control. Therefore we come to an appraisement on the relative research of domestic and oversea. And then we introduce the different markets for corporate control and the unique market for corporate control in China. Furthermore we make an analysis on the mechanism of control transferring in China from the aspects of equity property, behavioral finance and a model of control transferring, which draw to an assumption of control transfer value that the control transfer of listed companies reflect more about the private control benefits of future large shareholder and could have some considerable bubble as well so that they might not increase the value of target company remarkably and the function of resource allocation can not work efficiently because of the unique stock market in our country. In the further we use the empirical analysis on both the market response and company operation performance through the transferring of corporate control by the methods of event study, accounting study and factor regressive analysis and in this way we confirm our assumption. At last we put forward several policy suggestions for the establishment of market for corporate control of both efficient and normative in China.