Conformation And Efficiency Of Chinese Market For Corporate Control

OfConformation and Efficiency of Chinese Market for Corporate Control Market for corporate control is the mechanism that difierent management teamcontest for and exchange corporate control right．From microcosmic view,Market forcorporate control is the most important exterior mechanism in modern market systemto solve the agency problem and the public choice problem of corporations,in orderto achieve incentive mutually and improve efficiency of resource using．Frommacrocosmic view,as a significant function module of stock market,the efficiency ofmarket for corporate control determines the scale and efficiency of stock market andalso influences the degree of finance deepening of a country． In their classic literature,Modern corporate and private property,Berle andMeans look through modern corporations from economics and law approach and putforward the famous viewpoint"separation of ownership and control"．That is meansmanager but not shareholders is the actually controller in modern corporations whoseshares is dispersed．Jenson and Meckling bring forward the concept"agency cost''todescribe the efficiency loss owing to the separation of ownership and control and theinterest inconsistent of manager and shareholder．From then on,how to reduce agencycost becomes the most important subject of corporation govemance． Manne firstly developed the theory of Market for corporate control．He deemsthat there is a market for corporate control outsides corporations．If shareholderscouldn't replace the inefficient managers directly,they sold their shares at a low price,SO the purchaser will takeover the corporation and dismiss the managers at last．Thetheory foundation of Market for corporate control is the price of stocks is highlypositive related with the efficiency and effort of manager in a corporate．Based on thisframework,many economists developed the mainstream neo-classic theory of Marketfor corporate control． Although the mainstream theory has a perfect logic,it is not sustained byempirical studies of economists and financial scholars,especially on the relation ofshareholder wealth and transfer of corporate control right．Takeover agitation in 80'hof last century provides lots of sample,but empirical studies couldn't yet explain whythe abnormal return for acquirers is negative． Furthermore,the respect of mainstream theory is the relation of manager andshareholders,and takes the market for corporate control as the exterior mechanism forreducing agency cost．Many economists have doubted this approach．For,in fact,shareholders are divided into controlling and minority,and they have different interestJust as Shleifer and Vishny has put,the basic angecy problem in modem corporationsis not that the conflict between manager and outsider investor but that the conflictbetween minority shareholder and controlling shareholder who control managerscompletly．Economicst and legist began to study how law and regulation systeminflunet the efficiency of the market for corporate control by comparative institutionalanalysis methodolagy．The studies has give us a fundation to comprenhand theinstitutional factors which influnt the efficiency of market for corporate contr01． This dissertation will focus on the significance of cultivating an efficient marketfor corporate control,which has great significance for the reform of SOEs and thereconstruction of stock market．The main theory foundation is that the market forcorporate control is not only the exterior mechanism to solve the agency and publicchoice problem in modern corporations but also the market condition for theentrepreneur innovation．Furthermore an efficient market for corporate control willreduce the information noises of stock market and attract outside investors switchingtheir saves to investment,and accelerate the development of stock market and macroeconomy． As far as china?...