Leverage In Antitrust

The Coca-Cola/Huiyuan decision is the first denial issued by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) under the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) rules. This article focuses on the theory of leverage posited by MOFCOM in the official notice. The theoretical implication and historical development of the leverage as well as the judicial application are illustrated. The article will demonstrate the unreasonableness of MOFCOM's forbidden upon the leverage on the basis of the key facts and relevant theories.This article contains the following six parts :The forewords present the purposes, objectives, research methods and meaning of this article.ChapterⅠof this paper lays out the theoretical implications and applicable scopes as well as the historical developments of leverage theory. This part draws the views of traditional, chicago, post—chicago school and defensive leverage theory on leveraging. Based on the above demonstrations, this part analyzes the similarities and differences of the ideas. The focus of this chapter is the defensive leveraging, which is a groundbreaking result of the leverage theory. The life cycle of monopoly, threats to the primary monopoly and precautions by the leverage are logically developed. This part establishes the essence of defensive leveraging: It is not an attempt to reap additional monopoly profit from a second market, but an effort to protect the primary monopoly from the natural forces of competition.Chapter II details a series of basic issues of leverage, including legislations and practices of it in the U.S. As to legislation, I try to demonstrate the relevant provisions of leverage in the Sherman Act, Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Besides, I divide judicial practices into four phrases by different judgment standards.Chapter III employs the traditional leverage theory and the chicago argument as the theoretical model on the basis of the facts of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Merger. After analyzing the case, the theoretical unreasonableness of MOFCOM's decision are illustrated.Chapter IV discusses the possibility of leveraging MOFCOM concerned, mainly through some comparative analysis of a similar case in Australia in 2003, as well as in the consideration of the tactics of the non-grocery trade channel.The conclusion summarizes the key viewpoints in this article and literatures the merits and effects of this case. In additional, I try to provide some suggestions on perfecting both exiting regulations and administrative practices. In the end, the defaults exiting in the research of this case are pointed out.