Research On The Theories And Practical Problems Of The Financial Rights Allocation In Board Of Directors

Board of directors, the highest level in the decision and control system of modern companies, which exercising corporate property rights in the name of company, is the core of corporate governance structure. The board governance is related to the benefits of both company and shareholders directly, and its efficiency improvement has become one of basic ways and effective patterns to promote the company's achievement and perfect the capital market. For a long time, the governance condition of the state-owned company has been unsatisfactory, and there is a great deal of questions in its board composition, financial rights allocation and operation efficiency, etc. Relevant researches mainly pay attention to the relation between the administration mechanism (such as board composition or ownership structure) and results (such as company performance), but seldom study the financial function and rights allocation of the board of directors directly. So the research regarding board of directors as a relatively independent administration target has significant academic and realistic meanings.This thesis, comprehensively using property rights theory, financial rights theory , corporate governance theory and principal-agent theory, building on the core of the financial rights allocation in board of directors, and combining the case analysis made discussion on some relative topics. Firstly, based on the documents review and theory analysis, this thesis defines the subject position of the board of directors in participating in financial rights allocation. Secondly, this thesis expounds the allocation mechanism and points out that the board has three main financial rights, including the great financial operating right, the financial supervision right and the financial executing right. And it has discussed the realization of financial rights allocation from the organization mode, the institution framework and the encouragement and restraint mechanism of the board of directors. Thirdly, this thesis proposes some countermeasures to strengthen the board's allocation from both inside governance and outside governance perfection by the analysis of the current situation of board governance in our country. Finally, we choose Shanghai Fenghua Limited Company to analyze financial rights allocation of listed companies, analyze reasons and raise further perfection measures.