Study Of Chess Play Against Collective Corruption

This decade of China witnesses quite a number of cases of collective corruption. The officials involved in corruption and the mode of corruption indicate that China is emerging a tendency of"collective corruption". As corruption is mostly related with the political system, the collective corruption is also closely related with the defect of control and supervision system. The collective corruption, particularly the official collective corruption turns the local authority into an"independent corrupt kingdom"where nobody outside of the kingdom can enter. Presently, China witnesses a transitional phase in politics and economy. The transitional phase provides many opportunities for the corrupt. If the corruption can not be contained, the corrupt will bring a great risk to the transitional phase. Therefore it is significant to establish an anti-corruption system. This paper, from a non-logistic game theory perspective, takes a case study of Ma De as an example to disclose the nature and the harms of the collective corruption so as to promote the process of China's anti-corruption.This paper comprises four parts:Part one presents the game theory, non-logistic game theory and the current state of studying corruption with game theory and the perspective of this paper. Nowadays many people use logistic game theory to study corruption, setting up a game model corruption and analyzing the reasons leading to corruption. This paper tries to adopt non-logistic game theory to disclose the reasons and harms of collective corruption.Part two introduces the typical case of collective corruption—Ma De case of Heilongjiang Province. Through analysis of the case, this paper finds out the three types of form and four characteristics of collective corruption. Ma De case is a typical case of collective corruption investigated and solved in recent years. As this case involved many people and lasted a long period of time, it has caused irrecoverable harms to the society and the people. This paper analyzes the case of collective corruption and finds out the features of cases of collective corruption.Part three takes the case as an example and adopts the four factors of price bargain of non-logistic game theory to analyze the reasons of collective corruption. The four factors are restraint, rule, creditability and result. This paper analyzes the reasons leading to the failure of"restraint"and administrative supervision to collective corruption, the reasons leading to"rule"and the forming of collective corruption group, the creditability of punishment of collective corruption and the results of collective corruption. From the above four aspects this paper explores the reasons and harms of collective corruption.Part four presents the related reflections on collective corruption with a case study.This paper is original to adopt non-logistic game theory to analyze collective corruption with a case study. However, because each and every collective corruption case has different deep-structure reasons and harms, this paper can only arouse more interest from scholars who can further study the reasons and harms of collective corruption so as to promote the process of anti-corruption of China.