The Study Of Multilateralism Generation Under The Individualism Paradigm

This paper based on the James Caporaso's game model of multilateralism generation under the individualism paradigm, designed a new generated game model. Then we theoretically analyzed the catalytic factors in the three forms of multilateralism. The paper based on the parties' national strategy on the issue of North Korea nuclear and the policy options at the six-party talks. Then the paper analyzed rational interaction between countries at the six-party talks by three game models. Hence, this paper introduced theoretically the relationship between the multilateralism generation and the countries' compromise in a multilateral environment. So revealed the basic conditions of multilateralism generated under the individual paradigm.The core of Multilateralism means that coordinate the relationship between some three or more countries according to special principles. Multilateralism in the diplomatic practice is a highly demanding form. The path of multilateralism generation is one of the core difficulties in the theory study. Under the individual paradigm, the countries "enter" the contractual relationship between each other by a rational, self-interested way. However, the discipline is still not clear. Under the individual paradigm, the cooperation is the result of country's hope, capability and choice. And it is instrumental now. In order to know how to achieve cooperation among countries and then how to become a multilateral issue, this paper designed the "Beijing subway-style game model" to analyze the rational interaction between the parties during the multilateralism formation process on the basis of "K-Group Game", "repeated game" and "Game with transaction costs" model. In this game model, the member trade for profit, choosing to pay a game fee in order to reduce transaction costs many more times. They give up the choice of forsake strategic for avoid the collateral worst damage. They cautiously choose to withdraw the game for reduce the transaction costs. In the multilateralism practice, the multilateral cooperation will be guaranteed if plus additional compensation factors.In the problem of North Korea nuclear weapons, this article suggests that the aim of North Korea is solve the problem of economic and make sure the safety of county by own the nuclear weapons. So the policy that Korea in "six-party talks" should be:To win the time for the nuclear plan through pin down USA and Japan by China and Russia so that ensures the outside safety before they own the nuclear weapons. Meanwhile Korea plan to get more benefit by the limited concede just like "sausage cut". In order to stop the nuclear material and weapons got by the terrorists from North Korea and threat the safety of the USA, the USA government have to control the developing of nuclear weapons in North Korea, however the more important point is that USA government should consolidate the friendship with Japan and Korea so that leading the epoch-making change in northeast Asia to limit and keep watching his latent opponent grow up and serve for his global interest. The six parties proceed from their own profit to raise different claims and requiring and join in this matter by personal identity. It's full of pungent antinomy and same appeal in this course. In a word it's an intricate relationship. After the state of "six-party talks", the correlative parties seek for common ground during the contradictions and advance the talking course gradually. In this course, the common compromise between USA and North Korea has become the key point of this problem and the deterioration of the situation is just because of the USA and North Korea forbidden to temporize. This kind of practice supplies a vivid example for the creation of multilateralism under the normal forms of individualism.By the analysis of the three party's Grundy and through the creation of multilateralism under the normal forms of individualism, the article thought that must own a "K group" to form the main body strategy, but in repeat Grundy modal the vested interest parties stop the Grundy and each of them still can choose betray the strategy under the work of many other reasons are both can't avoided the risk. The risk to stop the Grundy and the time to stop it are direct proportion. The success of multilateralism is almost impossible. So according to the "six-party talks", this article design a modal called "the subway of Beijing". It proposes to establish a preventive control mechanism to increase the cost of options and rewards betrayal strategic cooperation to achieve a combination of the effect of constraints. Based on this, we could establish international organizations to ensure the continuation of cooperation and achieve the formation of multilateralism. In theory, it also requires a number of conditions. Firstly, it needs the common benefit self-identity. Secondly, it could form a "comprehensive and balanced" compromise the strategic environment that exists "K Group" in repeated games and form the main strategy of compromise. Finally, they have to make the proper rules so that can make the mutual restraint and cooperation mechanism to make sure that the compromise strategy can be done.