A Study On The Implementation Of International Agreements In Transitional Countries

The world nowadays, has always been in a dramatically changing form, whichlargely draws the features of the time. This process is driven by the progress oftechnology, culture interchanging, and talents movements, which happening not juston the structure of human knowledge accumulation, but more on the state-socialframe that we embed ourselves in. The challenges faced us today even greater thanany time of human history: to transform the state we organized is to reform the waywe managing the economy\politics and social movements, so that we could matchourselves up with this ever-advancing world.Those countries in transition are finding themselves in an even more urgent need to bewith those developed ones on development overall, and more likely to attempt theirefforts to reform themselves. But, it is complicated enough in their domesticcircumstances that keeps them far from a desired state, and the modernization forthese countries rates different level and blinds people from knowing truly of thecountries. To be specific, the key that keeps them staying away from a developedmode lies more on the domestic institutionalization that to a greater degree can telldifference between them and western developed countries. Government-designingpolicies drive every aspect of developing scheme, and the shortage of institutions thatcan best frame the policies in a proper process even intensifies the interferences,which in turn crates domestic issues internationally. That, their internationalcommitments must be binding with some of their domestic politics. Therefore, peoplewould better take the domestic politics issues into account before cooperating withtransitional countries. By observations, those powerfully political leaders will morelikely to abuse their political power to enforce any policies that can best promote theirinterests; and a badly divided nation will not be implicating the obligations of a dealthat smoothly. Which left two questions for the research that concerned dealimplication problems with the transitional countries: if, or if not these countries implicating their international commitments? And what degree these deal (orcommitment) will be dealt?The article applied the “Double Game” model from Helen Milner with the concernedquestions, and modified some of it into a practical one. With the case study for thelatter part, the article wishes to expend a new field for the academe, and providing acertain researching frame for the implementations-concerned. That is wheresignificance lies. Theoretically, the article determined to base its research on thedomestic level and take basic features of international game into the account, and thenbuilt its own analyzing frame for the certain subject. Three different analysis variables(Preferences\Information\Transformation in institutions) will be added into the frame,which can dynamically understand what the implicational issues meant for. And inpractice, this analyzing frame can best serve not just the state-governments, but moretransnational corporations when dealing with those unpredictable andpolicies-changeable countries, so that maintain their overseas interests in safety.The article focuses on the domestic factors of transitional countries that can largelyshed the influence on their international behavior. Three analysis variables are (a)domestic agents’ preferences;(b) interest groups’ behavior in theunbalanced-information circumstances;(c) the degree a country reformed. The articlewill launch the researching model that mostly based on the variables above, and reachthe conclusions.Economic cooperation between ASEAN member countries will be put into the contextto verify the conclusions of the model reasoning. It is a necessary step to claim thegeneralization and correctness of the analysis frame. Therefore, all of the cases in thearticle come out of the same time, and same international background, which meansto keep the studying variables (the arguments and dependent variables) totally in acontrollable manner. Meantime, the article arranges the cases simply by the threeanalysis variables to preclude the Selection Bias that greatly minimum the frame correctness. By comparing the cases in three different groups, the article reaches threeconclusions:(1) the differentiation of domestic agents’ preferences will largelyinfluence the transitional state behavior internationally;(2) the interest groups’lobbying can greatly balance the distribution of information, which adds possibilitiesto bind the state to act in accordance with the deal commitments;(3) a deeplytransitioned country will reinforce its international commitments to some degree.