Study On Executive Stock Options In The Listed Company Of China

For a long-term, the empowerment of the business executives has been an important subject for the enterprise's owners and the stockholders. Under the detachment system of the ownership and operating power, the relationship between the owners of enterprises and the enterprises' executives is the agent relation. In the process of agent, the "reverse choice" and"moral risk" resulted from the information asymmetry and the incompatibility in the object functions for the both bodies of the agent may be brought on with the result of the enterprise's value decrease. It is vital to resolve the issue. So the effective, long-term empowerment mechanism (executive stock options) has been adopted successively in the western countries and Chinese.Executive Stock Option (ESO) is an increasingly popular means of remuneration in developed countries.lt can protect the investors' profit and make the companies prosperous because it ties managers' responsibility and profit together.The article bases on the entrust-agent and human resources theory and chooses to the manager stock option as main research object. The paper analyses the theory and reality of stock option incentive mechanism under Chinese practical institution environment and strives to bring forward manager stock option incentive program suitable for the Listed Company of China.On the basis of adequate investigation and research, the dissertation becomes a creative thesis combining the contemporary circumstances, which has a few rational improvements. The author expects that the dissertation could sever the enterprise efficiently in the long-term executives empowerment with a good effect.