The Research Of Agent Problems Of State-Run Commercial Bank Of China

This thesis combines canonical study, empirical study, and comparison study, takes proxy theory which is one of the approach of the modern company theories as its starting point, and examines the State-run commercial banks in China in terms of the proxy chains. Based on extensive research performed by scholars, this thesis also absorbs and refers to the latest domestic and international study achievements, divides multiple commission agent relation network of state-run commercial bank into a fifth:(1)commission agent relation between government and president;(2)commission agent relation between president and staff member ; (3)higher authorities' competent commission agent relation while walking with the subordinate;(4)commission agent relation between bank and enterprise;(5)Commission agent relation between depositor and bank;carries out in-depth and meticulous discussion on the agent problems of the multi-level proxy relationships in the Chinese State-owned commercial banks system, and proposes some internal or external ideas and suggestions for how to cut down the agent problems.Agent problems exist in every aspect of human social and economic activities and they emerge whenever it is more efficient to perform something through commissioning others. In modern corporate enterprises, proxy relationships are common because of the high degree separation of ownership and operating rights, the development of social labor division, and management specialization, as well as it is more cost effective to adopt proxy operation. In proxy relations, proxy problems occur because of information asymmetry and discrepancies between the objective function of the consignor and the consignee. The solving of these proxy problems depends on the consignor's designing an internal "stimulation compatibility" mechanism and an external stimulation and constraint mechanism so as to encourage the consignee to work hard for the consigner's objectives. As the Chinese State-run commercial banks are of such characteristics as extensive coverage, large scope, irrational layout, poor quality, and low efficiency, this thesis conducts enormous quantitative and qualitative analysis on these characteristics. Furthermore, the Chinese State-run commercial banks' management system contains such deficiencies as owner vacancy, overlong proxy chains. The practical significance of using proxy theories to analysis the multi-level agent problems of the Chinese State-run commercial banks is that it is the necessary approach to address ownership vacancy of finance properties, to establish a sound corporate management framework in accordance with modern corporate systems.