Research On Principal-agency Problem And Incentive Mechanism Of State-owned Commercial Banks During Transition Period

Principal-agency in modern enterprise system shows that the separation of enterpriserand manager has created separating of power which the surplus to be come down on andpower which surplus control. Asymmetric information happens, and owing to informationasymmetric the principal of enterprise is faced with the problem how to supervise andencourage the agent to serve for himself, and the payout to solve this problem is agency cost.In order to urge the objective of agent approaching to that of the principal and achieve themaximization of the enterprise value and also guarantee the interest of agent, it is veryimportant to build up suitable mechanism of incentive and constraint.From the economic performance point of view, the thesis that the efficiency of plannedeconomy is lower than that of the market economy has already been widely accepted, andhence it has initiated the economic transition all around the world since the 1980s.As a resultof the planned economy system long-term influence and the state-owned commercial bank,the state-owned commercial bank reforms the obvious lag to the overall economicrestructuring. The prominent performance the question which for the state-owned commercialbank original and associated aspect and so on property right system and management exists,causes the investment person offside and the vacancy coexists and how to supervise andencourage the same time. Specially the sub-prime Crisis broke out in the early 2007 broughtfierce turmoil in global financial markets, and hit the commercial bank of America seriously.When joined after WTO in our country, is further open along with the finance industry andinternational competition intensifying, the state-owned commercial bank faced withunprecedented huge challenge. Large-scale reforms are also being executed inside thestate-owned commercial bank. The state-owned commercial bank all make great efforts in reforming the juridical-person-administrated mechanism by taking such measures asreconstructing, reforming the mechanism, introducing strategic investments. Among them,trying to construct a mechanism of effective incentive and powerful constraint is a veryimportant reform.Based on those problems and Chinese special economic situation, the thesis makes somesolid suggestions for the resolving methods. First, it indicates the problems of principal in thestate-owned commercial banks. Such as Central Huijin Investment had not fulfilled itsfunction of principal, and indicates the new chain of principal-agent which the state-ownedcommercial banks face now. In the following part, we focus on the setting up mechanism ofincentive in order to improve corporate governance. Finally, it gives some suggestions tosolve that problems.