Research On Governance Effects Of Debt Financing Among Chinese Listed Companies

The thesis firstly reviews the capital structure theory on the debt financing which plays important roles for corporate governance and points out the logical relations between debt financing and corporate governance. Then it analyses debt financing traits of the Chinese listed company and also draws a conclusion after an empirical research on 75 Chinese listed companies: governance effects of the debt financing is weakening and worsening among Chinese listed companies. On the basis, it emphasizes the influences of the stockholder's rights structure, debt structure, bank system and the stock market on governance effects of the debt financing. It includes: the stockholder' right structure of the Chinese listed company is unreasonable and it leads to the insiders' heavy control which is harmful to bring governance effects of the debt financing into force. The Chinese listed company's short-term debt can't limit the managers' right of handling free cash and the company hasn't met the liquidation danger for the reason of the debt restraint softening as well as bankruptcy, Chinese listed companies' long-term debt main is long-term loan and the company bond is only a few, so its debt structure is quite centralized which is not helpful to decrease the tactful violation, there are the same owners between state-owned banks and the listed companies, The commercial banks is not completely dependent "economic man" who burden the political tasks, so the banks as preferential creditors can not supervise well. The banks haven't played the true surveillance role as creditors. The imperfection of our stock market restricts the role which the listed company's debt financing plays. Lastly, the thesis gives its suggestions on four aspects: the corporation of the state-owned commercial banks, development of the corporate bond market, perfection of the bankruptcy mechanism and mainly-sponsored bank system.