Studies On Executive Stock Option Incentive In Non-state Owned Enterprises In China

The development of Non-state owned enterprises depends on the talents, so how to obtain them and use their abilities, i.e.the talents incentive problem becomes one of difficulties that Non-state owned enterprises must solve. Taking a broad view of the development of corporations in the western countries, executive stock option(ESO)has produced great effects. The paper aims to study ESO incentive problems in Non-state owned enterprises in China.Besides the start and the end, the body of the paper includes three parts: Part one descripts ESO incentive institution, mainly interprets some concepts ,such as Non-state owned enterprises, the executives. Part two analyses ESO incentive institution theoretically, especially from the angle of human capital theory, principal-agent theory, risk theory and game theory. Part three explores ESO incentive institution in practice. Firstly provides a review of some ESO patterns in China, secondly introduces the character of ESO in West Countries special in USA. and extends the difficulties of ESO in China, for example, macrosurroundings, capital market. finally the author proposes some views and plans to promote ESO development in China.