The Research On Accounting Rent-Seeking Behaviors Of Listed Company

As a normative article, it analyses the accounting rent-seeking in the processes of the change of accounting systems, establishing of the accounting standards and executing the accounting standards by using the achievement of demonstration research, game model, the basic theory and methods of pressure enterprises theory and behavior science for reference. It offers a new method for "reforming and opening" and the establishing and perfecting of the accounting standards according to China's situation and the base of deepening cognition of accounting rent-seeking.Accountant is able to transfer social wealth nonproductively by impacting establishment of accounting standards or choice of accounting policy and actually accountant is hard to be nonaligned. Some pressure groups are suffered while some pressure groups are benefited. Rent-seeking thought of modern economics is incarnated by this kind of accounting behavior fitly.Accounting standards has its economic consequences. The establishment of accounting standards is a result of conflicting and harmonizing of interest among pressure groups. During the process of the change of accounting systems, the balanced state of former accounting systems was broken. A new game encompassing the establishment of new accounting standards was started by the pressure groups that interrelated the standards. In China, "Double Track System" of accounting systems is a result of interest readjusting and compromise made by pressure groups, accounting rent-seeking acts a positive role in the process. On the contrary, "Double Track System" accelerates the occurrence of accounting rent-seeking further. The repeated games among pressure groups that interrelated accounting standards will make accounting rent-seeking achieving the situation of Nash equilibrium, according to the "double-edged" characteristic of accounting rent-seeking.The economic consequence of accounting standards is concerned widely by pressure groups, and it makes the process of establishing standards has heavy political tint. Government and enterprise participate in the establishment proved it. The participation of government and enterprise cause the waste of social economic source rent and corruption. This article analyzes the game between government, establishing organization of accounting standards and enterprise and works out Nash equilibrium by setup three sides game model. At the same time, according to the result that comparing with the managements of Chinese and American listed companies affect account rent-seeking behavior especially the rent seeking behavior appears in the process of establishing accounting standards, the article points out the concrete expressive formal of accountant rent seeking behavior systemically; analyzes the accounting rent-seeking behavior appears in the process of international establishing account standards by induct rent-seeking thought into international account standards.The rent-seeking behavior enclosing accounting standards also extends into the process of executing accounting standards. All pressure groups of listed companies are not able to actualize the purpose of transferring social wealth by keeping accounting standards absolutely, so that they choose accounting policy or execute by breaking accounting standards. The actualization of those accounting behavior mentioned above need the appraisal and agreement of auditor, it makes the accounting rent-seeking behavior - "opinion-shopping" appear in the process of executing accounting standards.Finally, according to the "two-edged" characteristic of accounting rent-seeking and the analysis of above parts, the article considers that we just can keep accounting standards with limits moderately.