Accounting Rent-seeking Behavior Research In China’s Overseas Investment Process

As a special kind of rent-seeking behavior, accounting rent-seeking behavior provides a"narrow" interests for some economic entities, but it produces very serious adverse economicconsequences such as financial information distortion, large social cost and serious distortionof resource allocation. Especially in the implementation of "going out" strategy, Accountingof rent-seeking activties not only brings new forms in rent-seeking，but also magnifies theimpact of the economic consequences with the internationalization of operation and thecomplexity of the environment.In this paper, combining with the rent-seeking theories of economics and accountingrent-seeking research, author expatiates rent-seeking behavior on overseas investmentfromseveral aspects,such as the principal, the motivation and conditions of rent-seeking behavior,economic consequences and so on. At last, the author puts forward specific policy advices.This article is divided into five chapters to analysis accounting rent-seeking in theprocess of foreign investment：Chapter1is the introduction, which describes the research background,significance andinnovation on the basis of analyzing the status of domestic and foreign research ideas andpapers of this study.In chapter2, the paper describes the accounting rent-seeking theory’s origins andimplications. On the view of accounting controls, property rights theory and game theory, thepaper analyzes the theory and thinking of other experts’ idea about connotation of accountingrent-seeking, and gives an own identity at last.Chapter3analyzes the accounting rent-seeking entity, the motivation, the generatingconditions and the define of rent in the overseas investment process.Chapter4analyzes the specific performance of rent-seeking in the process of overseasinvestment such as government’s guidelines for lobbying behavior, corporate earningsmanagement activities and intermediaries accounting "conspiracy".Chapter5analyzes the economic consequences of accounting rent-seeking，and putforward appropriate policy recommendations. As a non-productive activity, accountingrent-seeking does not create wealth，just redistributes wealth. The unclearness of publicproperty and the existence of moral risk， lead to the competing interests of all parties inevitably, the consume of the social costs and distortions in the allocation of resourceseventually. Although the part of local interest groups’ benefits may form a "Nashequilibrium",comparing with its negative impact, the benefit is nothing. In a word, it isimminent to control the accounting rent-seeking. And this paper gives some countermeasuresaiming at controlling the accounting rent-seeking.